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ABSTRACT 
 
In a relatively short time, the fossil-fuel divestment movement has emerged with global 
momentum, in light of the industry’s influence on carbon induced anthropogenic climate 
change. Divestment is pursued by investors as a means to either mitigate against the risks of a 
tightening carbon budget and of stranding assets or as a means of activism to force change on 
the fossil fuel industry. Literature on the topic to date suggests that divestment may have a 
direct impact on share prices or indirect impact stigmatizing the fossil fuel industry. 
Conversely, skeptics argue that divestment may be too small to have a measurable impact. 
However, there is no empirical study that distinctly measures the impact of divestment and 
related events on the fossil fuel industry.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to objectively measure the impact of divestment events and 
compare its efficacy relative to similar events. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is two-fold, 
asking whether divestment events impact the fossil fuel industry and whether divestment events 
are more impactful than events on the carbon budget and stranded assets. In line with existing 
literature from the anti-Apartheid divestment movement, this study adopts the event study 
methodology to measure the impact.  
 
The findings indicate that announcements of fossil-fuel divestment, stranded assets, and the 
carbon budget do negatively impact the share price of fossil fuel firms equally, on and around 
the event date. These results infer that the financial market perceives divestment and related 
events to be a material threat to the performance of fossil fuel firms. This thesis contributes to 
existing literature on fossil-fuel divestment by strengthening the ethical case that divestment 
can not only ‘do well’ as a financial tool but ‘do good’ as an activism tool as well. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Fossil-fuel divestment has ballooned to become one of the largest divestment campaigns in a 
few short years. It is often cited as a tool to force change on the fossil fuel industry, by directly 
depressing share prices or indirectly stigmatizing the industry across salient political and 
economic stakeholders. However, the impact of fossil-fuel divestment to date is just 
postulation. This thesis aims to measure the impact of divestment and related events on the 
fossil fuel industry by measuring deviations in the share price of carbon-major corporations.  
 
The motivation for this thesis is the need to understand whether the fossil-fuel divestment 
movement does in fact impact the fossil fuel industry as it is perceived to. Conflicting results 
on whether divestment had a measurable impact in the context of the anti-Apartheid campaign 
warrants further analysis in the context of the fossil-fuel divestment movement. To measure 
the impact of fossil-fuel divestment events on the share price of carbon major firms, this thesis 
adopts an event study method. The event study method measures how markets price new 
information that is perceived to be relevant to the expected returns of the fossil fuel industry. 
Notably, instead of measuring the real corporate response to divestment, this study infers how 
markets perceive the announcements and how their perception of the announcement is priced 
into the industry’s share value. 
 
The study adopts an intertemporal event study methodology, which measures the direction and 
magnitude of divestment related events on the stock performance of the fossil fuel industry. 
The event study analysis is a quantitative and empirical research method, which statistically 
measures cause-and-effect relationships between select events and fossil fuel securities. The 
study cites stakeholder theory, to explain why divestment related events influence the fossil 
fuel industry. Finally, the research adopts an epistemological and exploratory scientific 
perspective, and a post-positive and pragmatic world view. The following research framework 
will provide the high level perspective needed to further build the methodological framework 
required to address the gap in literature. 
 
The results of this thesis asserts that announcements of divestment are perceived to be material 
to the industry, as average returns experience a statistically significant decline on the day of 
the event. The results also state that announcements related to stranded assets and the carbon 
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budget have comparably significant declines in share price around the event day. The results 
are therefore in favour of divestment as an effective means to directly impact the share price of 
the fossil fuel industry.  
 
The results are most significant for advocates of fossil-fuel divestment, as a means to justify 
the impact of pursuing divestment for an investor. The study also advances event study 
literature on divestment and more broadly, corporate social responsibility by strengthening the 
argument that investors can influence corporate objectives through shareholder activism. 
Finally, the results are important for the fossil fuel industry, because it attests that fossil fuel 
divestment and related events all have a significant and continued negative impact on the share 
value of fossil fuel firms. 
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CHAPTER 2: DIVESTMENT 
 
This chapter presents an introductory perspective of the divestment movement. Divestment as 
a social movement has been adopted in the past, most recognizably against the human rights 
violations of the Apartheid system. Fossil-fuel divestment has recently emerged as a means to 
raise discourse on the ‘carbon budget’ and ‘stranded assets’, which cites that the majority of 
proven carbon reserves must remain grounded and rendered worthless, if global temperatures 
are to be stabilized under the 2°C target. Divestment is thus most commonly pursued as means 
of shareholder activism to weaken the industry and limit carbon emissions, or as a means of 
risk management against the impacts of asset stranding. Thus, the duality of the divestment 
campaign as a means to ‘do well’ and ‘do good’ will be discussed below. 
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2.1 Defining Divestment 
Divestment is defined as a socially motivated decision by private wealth owners or institutional 
investors to withhold capital from firms involved in a perceivably reprehensible activities 
(Ansar, Caldecott, & Tilbury, 2013; Kaempfer, Lehman, & Lowenberg, 1987). This definition 
makes a number of inferences that can be expanded upon. 
 
Divestment is a socially motivated decision as opposed to a strictly financial or economically 
motivated action. In other words, divestment is often pursued to invoke a moral response, in 
addition to risk mitigation strategy. In fact, fossil-fuel divestment first gained prominence 
following Bill McKibben's Do the Math campaign, which encouraged investors to pursue 
divestment as a means of forcing change on fossil fuel companies (350.org, 2012).  
 
Divestment is pursued by institutional investors who control the funds of university 
endowments, pension funds, or other large holdings and withhold capital by selling publicly 
listed shares of carbon-major corporations. As of December 2015, over 3.4 trillion dollars of 
assets under management (and over 5 billion dollars in funds) have been pledged to be 
withdrawn from the fossil fuel sector (Arabella Advisors, 2015; Fossil Free, 2015; Nussbaum, 
2015). Investors can choose to divest from all fossil fuel stocks  or to divest from selected firms 
by risk profile, subsectors, or worst offenders (Paum, 2015). Withheld capital can directly or 
indirectly affect a firm’s decision.  
 
Finally, in the context of fossil-fuel divestment, the reprehensible activity is defined as the 
production and development of environmentally unsustainable assets that are at risk of 
premature devaluation due to a tightening carbon budget. Briefly, the carbon budget explains 
that nearly 80 percent of proven reserves must remain grounded to limit global temperatures 
under the 2°C threshold (Meinshausen et al., 2009). If the carbon budget is to be met, the 
grounded reserves and related activities may suffer premature write-downs and effectively 
become worthless (Caldecott, Tilbury, & Carey, 2014). Stranded assets and the carbon budget 
will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 3 below. 
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2.1.1 Divestment as a Socially Responsible Investment 
Divestment can be understood as a form of socially responsible investing (SRI) because it 
applies ethical screening criteria to select investment decisions (Renneboog, Ter Horst, & 
Zhang, 2008). These screening criteria can be driven by an ethical conviction to align personal 
values or societal concerns within investment decisions (Schueth, 2003; Shank, Manullang, & 
Hill, 2005; Statman, 2006), or as a prudent management tool to internalize environmental or 
social investment risks (Weber, 2010). In the context of divestment, ethical screening may also 
be coupled with positive selections which encourages reinvestment toward clean energy 
developments (Divest-Invest, 2015). Critics argue that socially responsible investments are a 
constraint to investors (Bello, 2005; Dorfleitner, Halbritter, & Nguyen, 2016) that is motivated 
by misplaced guilt (Johnsen, 2003) or that socially responsible investments have little influence 
on corporate behaviour when screened by their business type or industry (Knoll, 2002). In this 
respect, the purpose of divestment as a socially responsible investment is twofold; to ‘do well’ 
as a risk management tool and to ‘do good’ as a social activism tool.  
 
2.1.2 Divestment as a Social Movement 
Divestment can also be understood as a means of social activism. The movement illustrates 
how individual stakeholders cam collectively mobilize to advocate for social justice (Grady-
Benson & Sarathy, 2015). Together grassroots movements of activists have staged multi-day 
sit-ins, petitions, iconic ‘shantytown’ and ‘human oil spill’ protests, and boycotts where 
applicable (Pitterman & Markun, 1978; Soule, 1997). These initiatives are often complemented 
by high profile endorsements and mass campaigns by shareholders and stakeholders alike 
(Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 2004; Ngeleza & Nieuwhof, 2005). Thus, the divestment movement 
is not simply about the pledge to withdraw, but a larger movement preceded by many small-
scale dialogues across stakeholders and institutions, which together advocate for social justice. 
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2.2 The History of Divestment Campaigns 
Divestment as a means of addressing a perceived injustice is not a new phenomenon and has 
been most famously in the context of the racial conflicts and human rights violations of the 
South African Apartheid (Arnold & Hammond, 1994; Grossman & Sharpe, 1986; Posnikoff, 
1997; Rudd, 1979). In smaller part, divestment has been campaigned against the health impacts 
of tobacco industry (Cogan, 2000; Wander & Malone, 2004), the Darfur genocide (Bechky, 
2009; Patey, 2009), Burmese militancy (Freeman, 1996), Israeli war crimes (Makdisi, 2003) 
and of other ‘sin stocks’ as well (Fabozzi, Ma, & Oliphant, 2008; Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009). 
The perceived successes of past campaigns are cited as demonstrable examples of why and 
how fossil-fuel divestment too can effectively influence the fossil fuel industry. The ‘fossil 
free’ initiative (2014, p. 1) for instance, explicitly states that as the anti-Apartheid divestment 
campaign “helped break the back of the Apartheid government… we hope that the fossil-fuel 
divestment movement can help break the hold that the fossil fuel industry has on our economy 
and our governments”. In this respect, a short comparative analysis of the anti-Apartheid 
divestment campaign and the fossil-fuel divestment campaign is presented in the following 
section. 
 
2.2.1 The anti-Apartheid Divestment Campaign 
The anti-Apartheid divestment campaign was pursued by European, American, and South 
African investors (Lansing & Kuruvilla, 1988), as a means to raise awareness of and combat 
the South African Apartheid legislature that viewed the coloured community as inferior 
(Ngeleza & Nieuwhof, 2005). The campaign primarily targeted 255 American companies 
(Coons, 1986) and banks (Gosiger, 1986) for their involvement in Apartheid South Africa. The 
intention of the divestment campaign was to limit new investments, deprive access to new 
financial capital, and in turn weaken and overthrow the apartheid regime (Hunt, Weber, & 
Dordi, 2016). While there is some evidence that investors that chose to divest from companies 
with South African operations may have suffered reduced earnings (Simon et al., 1985), there 
is little consensus on whether divestment had any direct or indirect impact on the eventual 
failure of the Apartheid (Gosiger, 1986; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  
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2.2.2 The Fossil-fuel divestment Campaign 
The fossil-fuel divestment campaign is spearheaded by public organizations like universities, 
faith based groups, governments, and pension funds (Fossil Free, 2015) as a means to raise 
discourse on the carbon budget, stranded assets, and continued fossil fuel production. The 
campaign primarily targets 200 of the largest publicly listed fossil fuel firms (Alexeyev, 
Connolly, Di Rosa, Francis, & Palmier, 2015) based on the potential CO2 emissions of their 
reported reserves. In contrast to the anti-Apartheid campaign, the intention of fossil-fuel 
divestment is to stigmatize the industry and delegitimize the industry’s political, economic, and 
social licence to operate (Vaughan, 2014). Evidence to date suggests that portfolios that reduce 
their carbon exposure can outperform market indexes (FTSE, 2014; MSCI, 2016) which might 
predominantly be due to the recent decrease in oil prices. Nevertheless, there is no empirical 
evidence on the impacts of the fossil-fuel divestment campaign on the industry.  
 
2.2.3 Comparing the Divestment Campaigns 
Hunt, Weber, and Dordi (2016) compare the anti-Apartheid and fossil-fuel divestment 
campaign to assess whether the two campaigns share common strategies, intentions and 
outcomes. The study infers that while the purpose of the two divestment campaigns does differ 
(to abolish the Apartheid regime versus force change on the industry) the approaches taken do 
share some similarities. Most notably, both campaigns aim to coerce a political response by 
extending regulations against the injustice, limit access to financial capital by augmenting the 
company's cost of capital, and raise public awareness of the injustice in an effort to revoke the 
company’s social license to operate. Moreover, both campaigns aim to benefit shareholders by 
ensuring financial returns are comparable and opportunities for reinvestment exist. Thus, while 
the pressures and motivations to divest are familiar, the intended impacts on violating firms do 
vary.  Once again, there seems to be an emerging trend across divestment campaigns that there 
are two equally important sides to the divestment debate; one focusing on the financial 
incentive for investors as shareholders and the other on the moral imperative for investors as 
stakeholders. 
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2.3 The Two Sides of Divestment  
The two sides of the divestment debate revolve around an investor's opportunity to do well as 
a shareholder and the investor’s mandate to do good as a stakeholder. Grady-Benson and 
Sarathy (2015) attest that university campaigns are often rejected either because they are 
perceived to present significant transactional or risk induced costs or that divestment would 
have negligible influence in combatting carbon emissions. There is however, little consensus 
to strongly infer either side of each argument, with a large number of prestigious institutions 
on both sides, choosing to either divest or pursue other means of engagement. The following 
section looks to expand on both considerations, highlighting cases that support and dispute 
each argument. 
 
2.3.1 Investors as Shareholders 
Investors as shareholders are driven by value maximization. That implies that a rational 
investor would prefer to invest in the portfolio with the most favourable risk-return profile 
(Markowitz, 1991; Sharpe, 1994). Under an exclusively financial perspective, the pursuit of 
divestment must therefore offer competitive or better financial returns. A wide range of 
literature both supports and critiques that fossil-fuel divestment does, given recent trends, offer 
a superior risk-return profile.  
 
2.3.1.1 In Favour of Shareholder Impact 
Literature in favour of competitive performance is vast across academics and practitioners. 
There is evidence that the adoption of responsible investments and fossil fuel free portfolios 
both outperform traditional indexes. 
 
Literature on responsible investments infer that it is favourable to account for environmental, 
social, and governance (ESG) and sustainability factors in investment decisions. In fact, a 
publication by UNEP-FI (2015) draws on the argument that the failure to consider for ESG 
indicators in investment decisions is a failure of an investor's fiduciary duty; integrating ESG 
considerations in contrast, enables investors to make prudent financial decisions and improve 
their financial performance. In a similar vein, Walker et al. (2014) propose that investors who 
account for sustainability criteria within the capital asset pricing model can effectively manage 
their portfolios to maintain direct returns today, while concurrently mitigating indirect long-
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term risks. In contrast to the traditional perspective that responsible investments constrain 
diversification and thereby performance (Rudd, 1981), recent studies suggest that the 
performance of socially responsible funds may not differ significantly from conventional funds 
(Bello, 2005) and may even outperform the conventional investments (Weber, Mansfeld, & 
Schirrmann, 2012). 
 
In regard to environmental risks from the fossil fuel industry, a number of studies compare the 
financial performance of prevalent market indices to fossil free counterparts. The MSCI ACWI 
ex fossil fuels index for instance, tends to comparably or out-perform the MSCI ACWI over a 
five year period (MSCI, 2016). Another complementary report by the FTSE finds that their 
counterpart ex fossil fuel index performs competitively with lower volatility than the traditional 
FTSE developed index (FTSE, 2014). Yet another study by Sustainable Insight Capital 
Management finds that of three fossil fuel free portfolios created, all outperformed the S&P 
500 across 1, 3, and 5 year periods between 2008 and 2013 (Willis & Spence, 2015). Most 
recently, a study on the Canadian market also finds that to fossil free portfolios outperform 
their associated benchmarks, with a superior risk-return trade-off than traditional portfolios 
(Hunt, 2016). These results are further attested across analyses conducted by organizations like 
the Carbon Disclosure Project (Fanelli, 2012) and Impax Asset Management (Simm, 2013), 
which suggest that by reducing carbon exposure in their portfolio, investors can achieve 
competitive if not greater returns. Again, economic factors like oil prices have played a 
predominant role in recent underperformance of the industry. 
 
2.3.1.2 Against Shareholder Impact 
In contrast, other studies propose that fossil fuel investment continues to be favourable and the 
decision to divest can suppress a portfolio’s financial performance.  
 
In the context of responsible investments in general, some studies warn that investment 
constraints may pose significant costs for investors (Geczy, Stambaugh, & Levin, 2005; 
Renneboog et al., 2008). Other studies postulate that investors may also face a cost of pursuing 
ethical or exclusionary screening, that may lead to increased risks or decreased returns 
(Richardson, 1987). 
 
10 
In the context of fossil fuel investments, one study by Bloomberg New Energy Finance 
proposes that fossil fuel investments remain favourable because they offer the scale, liquidity, 
growth, and yield that alternative investments cannot compete with (Bullard, 2014). The report 
further infers the market would require a massive scale-up of new investment vehicles to offer 
comparable opportunities for reinvestment.  
 
On the topic of fossil-fuel divestment, three studies propose that the decision to divest could 
harm the financial performance of investors and endowments. The first study indicates that the 
financial returns from oil and natural gas stocks across the 2000s far out performed the overall 
performance of American college and university endowments (Shapiro & Pham, 2012). 
Another study suggests that the “costs to investors of fossil fuel divestiture are highly likely 
and substantial, while the potential benefits – to the extent there are any – are ill-defined and 
uncertain at best” (Fischel, 2015, p. 3). The last study calculates that divestment could cost 
millions in lost returns annually, as endowments exchange portfolio diversification for moral 
imperatives (Cornell, 2015). Costs to pursuing divestment can also arise from administering a 
reinvestment program (Ennis & Parkhill, 1986) and, if screening does prove to have a direct 
impact on the transgressing firm’s stock price, the cost of changes in stock performance as well 
(Knoll, 2002). 
 
2.3.2 Investors as Stakeholders 
Investors as stakeholders play an important role in guiding corporate responsiveness. Those 
investors who are most salient to the firm (R. K. Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) also have the 
most influence on corporate decisions. Under a stakeholder view, investor’s must be certain 
that their decision to divest does in fact influence the fossil fuel industry. A wide range of 
literature both supports and critiques this perspective.  
 
2.3.2.1 In Favour of Stakeholder Impact 
The influence of shareholder activism can be direct, by reducing the demand for shares in the 
market or indirect, by stigmatization of the industry. In detail, Paum (2015) proposes that if 
discourse on divestment is perceived to be a material threat to the valuation of the industry, the 
efficient market will directly depress share prices in the short term in fear of future 
consequences to growth projections. Depressed share prices will discount the industry’s 
projected cash flows, raise costs of capital financing, and weaken production capacity in the 
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long run. In contrast, Ansar et al. (2013) proposes that divestment will have little direct impact 
on share prices. The greatest impact would not come by directly influencing the firm’s debt or 
equity, but rather through the indirect stigmatization of the industry. Negative stigma can 
undermine the industry’s reputation with other salient stakeholders (i.e. policy makers and 
financiers), prompt increasingly restrictive legislation, and weaken investor confidence in the 
industry. 
 
A report by the OECD highlights two examples whereby the stigmatization of divestment has 
already prompted corporate response (Baron & Fischer, 2015). Peabody cites divestment in its 
risk disclosures as a factor that may adversely affect demand for the company’s products or 
securities and the Australian mining industry encourages companies to pursue diversification 
into renewables and low carbon technologies to strengthen investor confidence. The response 
therefore infers that divestment may do little in the way of directly affecting the fossil fuel 
industry’s performance, but rather will be most effective in triggering a widespread 
stigmatization of the industry.  
 
2.3.2.2 Against Stakeholder Impact 
Conversely, other studies propose that divestment will do little in the way of influencing the 
fossil fuel industry and climate targets, due to the industry’s size, influence and global 
entrenchment. 
 
Most recognizably, the direct impact of divestment on equity is argued to be limited given that 
the small sum of funds being divested cannot significantly perturb stock prices (Ansar et al., 
2013; Bullard, 2014). Moreover, the divested equity will simply be acquired by less scrupulous 
investors relatively quickly and at a discounted rate (Ansar et al., 2013). In this regard, it may 
be more beneficial to engage with the industry to pursue change.  
 
Global entrenchment of fossil fuels further complicates the pursuit of divestment as a means to 
meet the carbon budget targets, not only from direct demand for energy but also through the 
indirect impacts of the industry across other industries. Ritchie and Dowlatabadi (2015) for 
instance, argue that divesting from all fossil fuel companies would only decrease the UBC 
endowment carbon exposure by around 3 percent, given the demand for carbon intensive 
products in other industries. Another study by Knoll (2002) argues that while the anti-
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Apartheid campaign was successful because corporations could simply withdraw their business 
operations in South Africa, corporations involved with fossil fuel developments will not simply 
stop producing fossil fuels. In the same vein, divestment would not impact national or state 
owned corporations like NICO and Saudi Aramco, who own a large bulk of proven reserves 
(Paum, 2015). Finally, it is likely that the decline in stock prices in recent years are more 
sensitive to changes in price levels than to the reputational risks of divestment (Baron & 
Fischer, 2015).  
 
2.4 Conclusion and Next Steps 
The purpose of this chapter was to explain what divestment is, how divestment campaigns 
work, and how the fossil fuel campaign is pursued as a means to ‘do well’ and ‘do good’ for 
investors. To reiterate, fossil-fuel divestment has proliferated as a means for investors to 
financially disassociate from the fossil fuel industry for either financial or ethical reasons. 
However, the divestment movement is more than just a pledge to divest; it is a larger means of 
social activism whereby endorsements, campaigns, which together work to influence the fossil 
fuel industry. The intention is to raise discourse of the industry’s influence in climate change, 
through the carbon budget and risks of stranded assets. Finally, for divestment to be pursued 
the campaign must be perceived to both ‘do well’ and ‘do good’ for the investor. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE CARBON BUDGET 
AND STRANDED ASSETS 
 
This chapter presents an in-depth analysis of current literature on the factors that have prompted 
the development of the divestment movement. The campaign was inaugurated by Bill 
McKibben’s (2012) ‘Do the Math’ campaign, which stressed the importance of meeting the 
carbon budget to mitigate the worst of global temperature rise. Meeting this carbon budget 
however, will strand many of the existing reserves, rendering them unburnable.  This chapter 
expands on the pressures at play to meet the carbon budget and exasperate asset stranding and 
the implications for investors. 
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3.1 The Carbon Budget 
Carbon emissions must be restricted, to limit temperatures under 2°C warmer than pre-
industrial levels. The carbon budget quantifies the limit of carbon emissions that can be safely 
emitted if global temperatures are to be limited to under 2°C. 
 
3.1.1 Carbon Dioxide and Climate Change 
The science of climate change is well understood; the increased production of long-lived 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere have on average raised global temperatures by 0.8°C from 
the pre-industrial era (IPCC, 2014); nearly half of the globally accepted 2°C target that was 
agreed upon in the Copenhagen Accord (Accord, 2009). Increased concentrations of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions, most affiliated with increased fossil fuel use (Quéré et al., 2013), 
continue to accumulate in the atmosphere well above the safe level of 350 parts per million 
(ppm), effectively raising global temperatures toward the 2°C threshold (Hansen et al., 2008). 
For context, mean global emissions currently sit at over 404 ppm (Dlugokencky & Tans, 2016) 
outpacing the mid-Pliocene era, a time period where natural carbon levels were estimated to be 
between 360 to 400 ppm, mean global temperatures were two to three degrees warmer than 
pre-industrial times, northern latitudes (~60°N) were five to ten degrees warmer, and sea levels 
were at least 15 to 25 meters above modern levels (Stocker et al., 2014). Similar impacts in the 
global climate system have not been experienced to date, however, the accumulation of carbon 
through the human activity has been much faster than natural progression. An additional 2°C 
over preindustrial levels could be disastrous for global food and water systems, human health, 
ecosystems, and economic assets (IPCC, 2014), irreverably transforming people and the 
ecosystems they depend on across an increasingly inhospitable anthropocene era. Thus, to 
mitigate the worst of catastrophic climate change, global temperatures must be limited to under 
the 2°C threshold and consequently, carbon emissions must be stabilized at a safe operating 
space for humanity. 
 
3.1.2 Quantifying the Carbon Budget 
A seminal study on carbon emission targets calculates that if global temperatures are to be 
limited to under 2°C (with 80 percent probability), carbon emissions must be limited to 886 
billion tonnes (Gt) CO2 between 2000 to 2050 (Meinshausen et al., 2009). This is the ‘carbon 
budget’; the total amount of emittable carbon below the 2°C threshold. To put Meinshausen et 
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al.’s (2009) carbon budget in context, proven fossil fuel reserves (those which have a 90 percent 
certainty of being extracted) amount to 2,795 Gt CO2 (Campanale & Leggett, 2011), over three 
times as much as what can be safely emitted. As such, no more than one-third of existing 
reserves can be consumed prior to 2050 (IEA, 2012). To date, global carbon emissions are 
approximately 32 Gt CO2 per year, a figure that has negated an additional 321 Gt CO2 (over 
one-third) of the carbon budget between 2000 and 2009 alone (Friedlingstein et al., 2010). 
Simply put, the remaining carbon budget of 565 Gt CO2 is one-fifth of total carbon potential 
across the vast majority of proven fossil fuel reserves. Any effort to limit global temperatures 
at the 2°C target will thus require nearly 80 percent of proven reserves remain grounded. This 
is the groundwork that inspired Bill McKibben’s ‘Do the Math’ and resulting fossil-fuel 
divestment campaign, to raise a movement that will address the ‘terrifying’ new math of 
climate change (McKibben, 2012). 
 
3.1.3 Industry Response to the Carbon Budget 
Reserves of coal, oil, and gas are geographically widespread (BP, 2016). Oil reserves are most 
abundant in Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Canada, natural gas reserves are most abundant in 
Iran, Qatar, and the Russian Federation, and coal reserves are most abundant in America, 
Russia, and China. A study on the geographical distribution of fossil fuels suggest that the 
Middle East holds over half the unburnable oil and gas reserves and at least 90 percent of 
American and Russian coal must remain untouched in order to meet the carbon budget 
(McGlade & Ekins, 2015). Moreover, the study infers that unconventional and higher-priced 
reserves like that of Canadian and Venezuelan oil or of Arctic gas will be priced out of use. 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies does have the potential to extend the budget, 
by effectively preventing fossil fuel emissions from entering the atmosphere. However CCS 
would at most have a modest effect on overall levels of emissions, increasing the budget by 
125 Gt CO2 in an ideal scenario (Leaton, Ranger, Ward, Sussams, & Brown, 2013; McGlade 
& Ekins, 2015). 
 
Potential emissions can also be split by ownership as a large majority of emissions is highly 
concentrated among few nationally owned and privately owned corporations. Heede (2014) 
calculates that 63 percent of global industrial emissions from 1751 to 2010 (914 gigatonne 
carbon dioxide equivalent) can be directly traced to 90 carbon major national and privately 
owned producers of oil, natural gas, coal, and cement. By extension, the top 200 publicly listed 
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fossil fuel companies (ranked by the carbon emission potential of their fossil fuel reserves) hold 
a total of 555 Gt CO2, which is further concentrated among the top few listed corporations 
(Alexeyev et al., 2015; Campanale & Leggett, 2011). A pro-rata allocation of the global carbon 
budget would leave 115 Gt CO2 to be distributed across listed companies from 2015 to 2050 
(Leaton et al., 2013). Nevertheless, this has not curtailed continued exploration of new fossil 
fuel reserves to replace existing production; oil and gas reserves of the top 100 firms grew by 
2.5 percent in the 2014 while coal reserves grew by 1.4 percent respectively (Alexeyev et al., 
2015).  
 
3.1.4 Investor Response to the Carbon Budget 
Markets may be mispricing the risks of unburnable carbon held by listed companies, as 
valuation is in part calculated by the firm’s long-term growth potential. It is estimated that over 
50% of a firm’s value is dependent on the expected cash-flows a decade into the future (Carbon 
Trust, 2008). One indicator of future production is the firm’s reserve-replacement ratio, an 
indicator that measures whether a company is replacing more fossil fuels than is producing. 
Maintaining oil production and in turn firm valuation is therefore dependent on increased 
capital expenditures toward continually expanding proven, albeit increasingly marginal 
reserves (Leaton et al., 2013). The Carbon Tracker Initiative (2013) reports that the global 200 
publicly listed companies invested upwards of $674 billion in 2012 alone towards exploration, 
production, and refining expenditures. Increasingly these companies are investing in new 
reserves which are more expensive and technical marginal ventures, including bituminous 
sands, ultra-deepwater drilling, and shale gas production (Stockman, 2011). Moreover, as 
emissions, growth, and revenues remain concentrated among the largest companies (Alexeyev 
et al., 2015), smaller marginal producers are at risk of acquisition, as cost effective means for 
larger companies to expand their proven reserves.  
 
Though it is due to shareholder pressures that firms invest in expanding reserves, investing in 
companies that continue to replenish proven reserves may be a risky decision. In a 2°C 
scenario, grounded reserves could put over $28 trillion at risk; risks most concentrated on high-
cost high-carbon sources of production (Lewis, Voisin, Hazra, Mary, & Walker, 2014). To 
materialize the potential implications of grounded reserves for the industry and its investors, 
an example in the Carbon underground report (2013) shows that Shell’s valuation fell by over 
£3 billion in 2004 when the company contracted its proven reserves by about 20 percent - a 
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decision that depressed stock prices by 10 percent within the span of a week (Campanale & 
Leggett, 2011). Moreover, unburnable carbon poses knock-on effects that not only affect 
investors, but lenders, pension funds, and indeed individual savers as well. Bank lending 
exposures may face significant haircuts to the value of their loan books, pension funds may 
risk funding shortfalls to their pension entitlements as fossil fuel investments falter, and savers 
may face uncertainties akin to financial bubbles as their investments track carbon intensive 
markets (Campanale & Leggett, 2011). Financiers must therefore recognize that investing in 
companies that continue to allocate ever increasing capital expenditures toward replenishing 
assets that may never be used, may prove to be a risky decision. Notably, in light of these risks, 
financial institutions are beginning to examine their carbon exposure and developing solutions 
to reduce their risk (Alexeyev et al., 2015). 
 
3.2 Stranded Assets 
In a 2°C scenario, investments in high-carbon developments could be wasted if carbon reserves 
are to remain grounded. For instance, capital expenditures on the exploration of new reserves 
would be worthless and infrastructure developments may be mothballed or entirely abandoned 
before their economic life. In other words, investments in high-carbon developments that 
cannot be used could effectively become “stranded assets”. Stranded assets are defined as assets 
that suffer from unanticipated or premature write-downs, devaluations, or conversions to 
liabilities (Caldecott et al., 2014). The stranding of carbon assets in the case of fossil fuels can 
be caused by a number of environment-related risk factors that are poorly understood and 
regularly mispriced (Caldecott et al., 2014). 
 
3.2.1 Risks to Asset Stranding 
A scenario analysis of stranded assets by Caldecott et al. (2014) provides an encompassing 
framework of the most pressing environment related risks that could lead to the stranding of 
assets. The report infers that government regulations, environmental challenges, changing 
resource landscapes, technology innovations, evolving social norms, and litigations may be 
some common risks to asset stranding. 
 
The emergence of stringent government regulations in favour of climate change mitigation, 
energy efficiency, renewable developments, and human health pose significant risks to 
continued carbon intensive production. Policies such as carbon pricing and cap and trade are 
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enforced across national and regional governments, as direct measures to address climate 
change challenges (Kossoy & Guigon, 2012). Coal faces the greatest regulatory risk, with 
policy developments like the EU Plant Combustion Directive and the US Clean Air Act that 
directly target coal-fired power (Paum, 2015). Policies targeting air and water pollution can 
also place increased pressure on carbon intensive assets without directly restricting carbon 
emissions. China’s thirteenth five-year plan, for instance, aims to aggressively limit factory 
emissions and water intensity among other initiatives as early as 2021 (Qin, 2016). Policies 
targeting renewable developments are making alternative sources of energy more widespread 
in place of conventional fuels. In the US for instance, the Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) 
requires that electricity providers generate or acquire a certain portion of their power from 
renewable sources, such as wind, solar, geothermal or biomass (Rabe, 2006). Finally, 
speculation of impending policies encourages markets to react ahead of anticipated regulatory 
changes. One notable example is the intended national determined contributions (INDCs) that 
lay the groundwork for global emission reduction legislations over the coming years. 
 
Fossil fuel assets also face stranding from a changing resource landscape. North America’s 
expansion into liquid natural gas (Leaton, 2015) for example significantly disrupted oil demand 
across OPEC nations (Smith, 2015). In recent years, the fall in oil prices has also emerged as 
one of the most significant stranding risk to carbon major industries. Globally, the market value 
of oil and gas companies has dropped by over $580 billion in just a few months after the decline 
of the oil price (Paum, 2015). If these trends continue, the market may face a strictly 
economically-driven decarbonisation. 
 
New innovations in alternative energy may add to the risk of asset stranding. Advancements in 
energy storage are critical for the transition to renewable power, in the conversion of 
intermittent outputs to reliable power (Cookson, 2015). Moreover, rapid adoption of electric 
vehicles and energy efficient engines could further decrease demand for conventional energy 
sources in transport and infrastructure (Parkin, 2016).  
 
Recent developments in declining demand for conventional fuels may be a larger indication of 
changing social norms, away from what was once perceived to be a formidable and necessary 
evil (Whitley, 2015). Reputational damage from initiatives like the divestment movement may 
have long-term consequences for the industry, revoking the industry’s social licence to operate 
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across a range of stakeholders including investors to customers and employees (Maclean, 
2014). 
 
Environmental challenges from increasingly erratic weather systems can also lead to the 
stranding of assets. The Fort McMurray Wildfire for example, destroyed more than 3,000 
structures, stalled oil production for two weeks, and cost insurers nearly 9 billion CAD 
(Moudrak, 2016).  
 
Litigation may also become a more prominent risk for fossil fuel companies as communities 
take legal action in favour of the protection of the environment, health and livelihoods (UNEP, 
2012). One notable example include opposition to oil exploration in Nigeria, that has adversely 
affected agricultural land and biodiversity in the region (Frynas, 1999).  
 
3.2.2 Industry Response to Stranded Assets 
The impacts of more stringent regulations, economic drivers, innovation, and evolving social 
norms are already recognizable among fossil fuel sectors, many of which are struggling to 
remain competitive. 
 
Global coal demand is slowing. Declines are driven by global measures to reduce consumption, 
increasing pressures to improve efficiency, greater competition from alternative energy 
sources, and slower economic growth in China (Alexeyev et al., 2015; Maclean, 2014). 
Additionally, China - representing 50% of global coal consumption (Maclean, 2014) - 
continues to reduce its reliance on coal-fired power, due to concerns over poor air-quality and 
its associated health impacts. Oversupply in turn has caused coal prices to fall, most directly 
affecting new export driven mines to operate at a loss (Alexeyev et al., 2015). Efforts to open 
new mines in the recently approved Galilee Basin, the largest coal deposit in the world, have 
struggled to secure financing (Taylor, 2014) given its implications on global coal supply, coal 
prices, and potential for stranded assets. 
 
The oil sector is facing historically low prices, yet reserves continue to grow. The share of high-
cost proven reserves will need to be redefined as probable or possible as a large majority will 
no longer be economically viable to produce. Major fossil fuel producers have faced credit 
rating downgrades in the midst of low oil price and rising debt, making it increasingly more 
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difficult to acquire financing for new developments (Ailworth & Hufford, 2016; Armental, 
2016). 
 
 
3.2.3 Investor Response to Stranded Assets 
Investors can take a range of measures to protect their investments from exposure to stranded 
assets. Strategies vary from holding and engaging with industries to encourage best practices 
or divesting away from the industry.  
 
Investors who choose to hold fossil fuel stocks can take active steps to diversify away from 
stranded asset risks by reducing exposure to assets with high risks of stranding or hedging 
upside potential with opportunities that thrive in a low carbon economy. In some instances, this 
practice can enhance the value of an investor’s portfolio (UNEP, 2014).  
 
Investors who choose to hold can also engage with vulnerable companies, as key stakeholders, 
to influence corporate strategy in favour of the low-carbon transition. Investors can engage 
with companies to ensure 1) capital expenditures, acquisitions, and valuations are justified, 2) 
low-carbon projects are pursued, 3) stranding risks are internalized in equity and debt 
valuations, 4) executive resolutions account for environmental risks, 5) stakeholders are 
adequately engaged, and 6) carbon footprints are publically disclosed (Paum, 2015). One recent 
example of shareholder influence involves pushing the industry to pursue share buybacks, 
inferring that the company does not have a better plan for the capital other than to return it to 
the shareholders (Leaton, 2015). Investors can also choose to engage with these companies 
through collaboration with initiatives like the Investor Group on Climate Change (IGCC), 
Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC) and the Investor Network on Climate 
Risk (INCR) that work together to influence public policy and corporate behaviour (Towers 
Watson, 2015). Investors can otherwise look to organizations like the Sustainability 
Accounting Standards Board, the Carbon Disclosure Project, and the Asset Owners Disclosure 
Project, who engage with fossil fuel industries to disclose carbon risks (Generation Foundation, 
2013). 
21 
 
Finally, investors can choose to divest from carbon risks by screening out perceivably risky 
investments as a means to reduce exposure risk or reinvest towards the transition to a low 
carbon economy. 
 
3.3 Conclusion and Next Steps 
The purpose of this chapter was to explicate the importance of the carbon budget and stranded 
assets, as motivating factors for the fossil-fuel divestment movement. The analysis expands on 
some key pressures at play - the mounting evidence to limit carbon emissions with a carbon 
budget and the rising risks of stranded assets - and how these factors have already begun 
affecting the industry its shareholders. The necessity to restrict emissions to the carbon budget 
drives the investor's ethical conviction to limit carbon emissions, whereas the risks of stranded 
assets drive the investor’s financial mandate for competitive returns. Discourse on stranded 
assets or the carbon budget should thus be looked on comparably to fossil-fuel divestment 
initiatives. 
 
The first two chapters detail the relevance of the carbon budget, stranded assets, and the fossil-
fuel divestment movement, as one set of tools to address the issue of carbon induced global 
warming. The topics once again allude to the financial incentive for investors as shareholders 
and the ethical conviction for investors as stakeholders, however the results remain unclear.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH  
AND THEORY 
 
This chapter builds on the literature on divestment, stranded assets, and the carbon budget, to 
present the theoretical framework adopted in this thesis. First, the gap in literature is introduced 
as a lack of empirical evidence to support that announcements of fossil-fuel divestment, 
stranded assets and the carbon budget has an impact on the fossil fuel industry. The research 
question thus asks if instances of announcements of divestment, stranded assets, and carbon 
budgets have an impact on the share price of fossil fuel companies. 
 
This question is answered in the context of the efficient market hypothesis and stakeholder 
theory. The efficient market hypothesis explains why announcements of divestment, stranded 
assets, and the carbon budget will be priced into share valuations if the market believes that 
divestment will have an impact on the fossil fuel sector. The stakeholder theory explains why 
announcements of divestment may be more impactful than announcements of stranded assets 
and the carbon budget.  
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4.1 Literature Gap 
The literature so far suggests that divestment must be perceived as both financially favourable 
and ethically impactful to be pursued - attesting Grady-Benson and Sarathy’s (2015) assertion 
that fossil-fuel divestment is often rejected for one of those two reasons. Yet the argument for 
both is conflicting. This thesis will focus on the latter, to measure the impact of divestment and 
related discourse on the fossil fuel industry. Discourse on divestment and by extension, 
discourse on stranded assets and carbon budgets may directly (through reduced demand for 
shares) or indirectly (through stigmatization) influence the industry’s long term growth 
projections (Ansar et al., 2013; Paum, 2015). Critics cite that divestment cannot impact the 
fossil fuel industry and climate targets due to the influence and entrenchment of the industry. 
While there is ample postulation on the means by which divestment might or might not impact 
the fossil fuel industry, there is currently no empirical study to assess whether discourse of 
these topics have an impact on the fossil fuel industry.  
 
4.2 Research Question 
The study seeks to understand whether divestment announcements affect the share price of 
fossil fuel corporations. Divestment announcements are defined as instances of discourse, such 
as pledges to divest, endorsements, or campaigns, that present the topic of fossil-fuel 
divestment to the market. Comparably, announcements on stranded assets and carbon budgets 
also raise discourse on the topic through regulatory and economic pressures of industry 
stakeholders. Thus, the impact of divestment and related events on the fossil fuel industry’s 
share price can be studied across two related research questions. 
 
1. Do fossil-fuel divestment announcements have a measureable impact on the security 
valuation of prominent fossil fuel corporations? 
2. Are fossil-fuel divestment announcements more impactful than announcements relating 
to the carbon budget or stranded assets, in impacting the security valuation of prominent 
fossil fuel corporations? 
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4.3 Theory and Hypothesis 
To understand why a divestment announcement could impact the share price of fossil fuel 
firms, this thesis first turns to efficient market hypothesis, a subset of modern portfolio theory, 
that aptly explains how markets are efficient at immediately reflecting all available information 
into the price of a security (Fama, 1970). The impact of new information by shareholders of a 
firm can be estimated by its immediate effect on stock price, much before the corporate 
response to the new information (McWilliams, Siegel, & Teoh, 1999). In the context of fossil-
fuel divestment, the efficient market hypothesis explains why the very discourse to divest funds 
even before the funds are withdrawn, can immediately influence the stock price of firms in the 
fossil fuel sector.  
 
In contrast, to understand why announcements related to stranded assets and the carbon budget 
may be less impactful than announcements related to divestment, this thesis turns to the 
stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984). Stakeholder theory explains why actions by stakeholders 
can influence corporate objectives. Similarly, the impact of new information by stakeholders 
can be estimated by its immediate effect on stock price, before corporations respond to the new 
information (McWilliams et al., 1999). In the context of stranded assets and the carbon budget, 
the stakeholder theory explains why discourse on the topic by regulatory and economic 
stakeholders can provoke a corporate response, while the efficient market hypothesis explains 
why the anticipated corporate response by the market can immediately influence the stock price 
of firms in the fossil fuel sector. 
 
4.3.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The efficient market hypothesis explains how all available and relevant information is 
incorporated into the share price of a firm as soon as the information is publically announced 
(Fama, 1970). Thus, the efficient market hypothesis can measure the market’s response to an 
announcement well before the ‘real’ macroeconomic response. Fama (1970) further explains 
that depending on how information is absorbed, the efficient market hypothesis can take three 
forms – weak, semi-strong, and strong. This thesis assumes that markets have semi-strong 
efficiency, such that market prices reflect all compounded historical data and all publicly 
available information, but not private information. Fama et al. (1969) empirically apply the 
semi-strong market efficiency hypothesis, to test examine the process by which share prices 
respond to certain kinds of new information. The study finds that market anticipation (or 
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speculation) of adjustments in expected returns plays an important role in the pricing of shares. 
Jensen (1978) expands on Fama’s (1969) research to suggest that markets only perceive 
information as relevant till the point where the marginal benefit of acting on the information 
does not exceed the marginal cost. Together, Fama’s research on the semi-strong-form efficient 
market hypothesis lays the groundwork for why the impact of new information on a firm can 
influence the share price of the firm and how to measure this impact using the event study 
methodology (Fama, 1991). 
 
In the context of announcements related to divestment, stranded assets, or the carbon budget, 
the efficient market hypothesis explains that if markets perceive new information to be material 
to the fossil fuel industry’s expected returns, the share price will adjust to reflect the new 
information. Thus, in the context of the first research question, if divestment will impact the 
fossil fuel industry, the hypothesis stands;  
 
       H0:  Announcements will not have a measurable impact on fossil fuel stocks. 
       H1:  Announcements will have a measurable negative impact on fossil fuel stocks. 
 
The null hypothesis of no measurable response, infers that the market does not value the 
information as material to the fossil fuel industry. However, under the alternative hypothesis 
that divestment announcements do lead to a significant negative response, the efficient market 
hypothesis explains that the market perceives the information as material to the expected 
returns of fossil fuel firms. It would suggest that markets believe divestment can have a 
measurable impact on the industry, whether directly through reduced demand for shares or 
indirectly through the wider stigmatization of the industry. The efficient market hypothesis can 
be extended to explain the impacts of announcements related to stranded assets and the carbon 
budget on the fossil fuel industry as well. 
 
4.3.2 Stakeholder Theory 
The stakeholder theory explains why firms not only respond to pressures from its shareholders, 
but from stakeholders as well. It can be applied to understanding whether discourse on stranded 
assets and the carbon budget can impact a firm’s share value, even though these pressures arise 
from industry stakeholders as opposed to the pressures of divestment by the industry’s 
shareholders. Literature on stakeholder theory is predicated around identifying who a firm’s 
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stakeholders are (Mitchell et al., 1997), what types of influences they exert (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995; Rowley, 1997), and how organizations respond to stakeholder influences 
(Jensen, 2001; Kolk & Pinkse, 2007). In line with the efficient market hypothesis above, if the 
market perceives stakeholder pressures as relevant to the industry, the share price will reflect 
the impact of the information.  
 
Stakeholders are most generally defined as a “group or individual who can affect or is affected 
by the achievement of a firm’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46). Examples of stakeholders 
include governments, communities, employees, customers, suppliers, political groups, trade 
associations, and indeed, investors as well (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). The theory explains 
that stakeholders can “explain and guide the structure and operations of the established 
corporation” (Donaldson & Preston, 1995, p. 70), in much the same way shareholders can 
influence corporate objectives of a firm. Consequently, stakeholder pressures can also impact 
the share price of a firm, in line with the efficient market hypothesis. However, not all 
stakeholder pressures are equally influential in impacting corporate objectives. Mitchell et al. 
(1997) further categorize the various stakeholders by their power to influence the firm, the 
legitimacy of the stakeholder’s relationship with the firm, and the urgency of the stakeholder’s 
claim. Stakeholders that possess more attributes are more influential. For instance, divestment 
advocates may hold an urgent and legitimate claim but also lack the power to enforce their will 
on the industry. Governments often hold a dominant role in influencing corporations, though 
fall short on the urgency or demand to influence corporate action. Comparably, financiers may 
have the power and legitimacy as dominant shareholders but continue to undermine the urgency 
of climate change by financing continued fossil fuel production. Finally, shareholders are 
dominant stakeholders, given their power, legitimacy and urgency to influence corporate 
action. These actions however are not independent to each other; the theory further explains 
how stakeholders can in aggregate influence corporate action through the interdependent 
relationships between multiple stakeholders (Rowley, 1997). The simplest view of the 
relationship between stakeholders and the firm is defined in Donaldson and Preston’s (1995, p. 
69) model, where stakeholders surround and exert influence on a focal organization. It is likely 
however, that stakeholders also influence each other, influencing not only organization but 
other stakeholder behaviours as well (Rowley, 1997, p. 891). Thus, divestment is a complex 
interconnected relationship between the divesting institutions, the fossil fuel industry, and the 
larger economic sphere. For instance, the New York Peoples Climate March in conjunction 
with the UN climate summit, preceded one of the most influential dates across the fossil-fuel 
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divestment movement, which included over 700 independent divestment pledges, including 
that of the Rockefeller fund, in the span of one day (Divest-Invest, 2014). Thus the stakeholder 
theory can adequately explain how discourse on stranded assets and the carbon budget, though 
have no direct influence on fossil fuel shares, can still influence corporate strategies and in turn 
the share price of fossil fuel companies.  
 
In the context of comparing announcements of divestment to stranded assets and the carbon 
budget, the stakeholder theory explains why the impact of divestment pursued by dominant 
stakeholders may be more influential than the impact of discourse on stranded assets and carbon 
budgets often pursued by indirect stakeholders. Thus, in the context of the second research 
question, if divestment announcements are more impactful than events of stranded assets and 
the carbon budget, the hypothesis stands;  
 
       H0:  All announcements have an equal impact on fossil fuel stocks. 
       H1:  Announcements of divestment have a greater negative impact on fossil fuel 
stocks than announcements of stranded assets or the carbon budget. 
 
The null hypothesis of equal response infers that the market views information related to 
stranded assets and the carbon budget equally to information related to divestment. In the 
context of stakeholder theory, this would explain that markets view pressures of indirect 
stakeholders comparably to the direct pressures of shareholders. Under the alternative 
hypothesis that divestment announcements do have a greater impact on fossil fuel shares, the 
stakeholder theory explains that the market perceives shareholders to be more influential than 
stakeholders in impacting corporate objectives. 
 
4.4 Limitations of the Study 
The study is limited in the scope of application and depth of analysis. These limitations 
however, offer opportunities for further study in the future. First, the scope of research is 
limited in application.  It does not include an analysis of whether divestment is the right move 
for shareholders, but rather, simply focuses on whether such events have any impact on the 
security valuation of fossil fuel corporations. Moreover, even if divestment announcements do 
in fact influence stock price, this study does not affirm that the carbon budget will be met. This 
is because the study is limited to publicly listed corporations, which hold only a fraction of 
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proven reserves. Additionally, while regulatory and financial limitations may successfully 
strand some marginal reserves, global entrenchment of fossil fuel demand will continue to drive 
production for the foreseeable future. The study also does not directly isolate the simultaneous 
impacts of declining oil prices in recent years.  
 
Finally, it is also important to recognize that event studies have no predictive ability and thus, 
cannot infer that continued divestment in the future will have the same impact as past 
campaigns. Second, the study is limited in its depth of analysis. The study does not differentiate 
between the impacts of divestment announcements on 1) oil, gas, and coal sectors, 2) country 
level discrepancies, 3) divestment pledges, campaigns, and events, 4) early versus late 
divestment announcements. There is evidence that these factors play an important role in 
influencing stock prices and as such, future event studies on the fossil-fuel divestment 
movement can more succinctly measure the impact of divestment and related events on fossil 
fuel security valuations. 
 
4.5 Conclusion and Next Steps 
The purpose of this chapter was to theoretically explain why divestment and related 
announcements may impact the share price of fossil fuel firms. Literature to date postulates 
why divestment may directly or indirectly influence the industry, but the results are conflicting. 
Moreover, there is no empirical literature conducted to measure this effect. Thus, the thesis 
asks if divestment events affect the security valuation of fossil fuel firms and whether 
divestment events are more impactful than stranded asset or carbon budget related events. The 
efficient market hypothesis is applied to understanding why divestment and related 
announcements may have an impact on the fossil fuel industry, if the market perceives the 
announcement as relevant to the industry. The stakeholder theory is applied to understand why 
divestment events may be a more impactful than stranded asset and carbon budget events. The 
next chapter introduces the method used to test whether divestment and related announcements 
influence the share price of fossil fuel firms. 
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CHAPTER 5: METHOD 
 
This chapter presents the methodology applied to conduct an event study analysis of divestment 
announcements on the stock performance of publicly traded fossil fuel companies. Specifically, 
the event study analysis aims to examine whether the divestment movement influences the 
firm’s stock value, to infer whether shareholders perceive divestment announcements as 
relevant to the fossil fuel industry. The purpose of this methodology chapter is to explicitly 
map the steps taken to achieve the study’s final results, in a manner that is objective and 
replicable.  
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5.1 The Event Study Method 
The event study model is an intertemporal statistical tool most commonly applied in 
accounting, economic, and financial literature as a means to measure the impact of new 
information on a select firm’s share price (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). The event study is a 
powerful tool to measure the impact of an event on a firm, because the effect can be observed 
over a relatively short time period through shifts in stock prices, rather than over a much longer 
period through direct productivity related outcomes (MacKinlay, 1997). This is because the 
event study is a test of the efficient market hypothesis, which infers that stock prices adjust to 
reflect all newly available information that is relevant to the value of the firm (Fama, 1991; 
Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, 1969). An event study analysis can thus measure the short run 
impact of a specific event on the value of a firm, given the assumption that all relevant 
information is immediately reflected in security prices (MacKinlay, 1997). However, not all 
information is relevant to shareholders; abnormal shifts are observed only when the profits to 
be made by acting on the new information exceeds the marginal costs (Jensen, 1978). Thus, 
negative abnormal returns from divestment announcements may infer that shareholders do 
perceive fossil-fuel divestment to be a material threat to the value of the industry.  This thesis 
adopts the stepwise procedure from MacKinlay’s (1997) seminal paper on event studies in 
economics and finance.  
 
In its most basic form, an event study simply compares a stock return on a specific event day 
to its anticipated return subject to a predetermined control period (Corrado, 2011). More 
specifically, the event study identifies a set of comparable exogenous events and endogenous 
stock samples, calculates expected returns across an estimation window, and measures the 
statistical significance of the actual returns to what was expected. Variations along the research 
design procedure however, can lead to conflicting results, which undermine the external 
validity of the outcome (McWilliams et al., 1999). The event study literature on anti-Apartheid 
divestment for example, all post conflicting findings, stemming from variability in the selection 
of samples and events, length of analysis, and the management of extraneous industry events. 
 
5.1.1 Applications of Event Studies 
The breadth of literature that applies the event study methodology is well developed; Kothari 
and Warner (2004) estimate that five leading journals (the Journal of Business, Journal of 
Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , and 
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the Review of Financial Studies) alone encompass a total 565 studies between 1974 to 2000. 
Event studies are most successfully applied in the area of corporate finance (MacKinlay, 1997), 
across studies on mergers and acquisitions (Eckbo, 1983; Jarrell, Brickley, & Netter, 1988; 
Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989; M. C. Jensen & Ruback, 1983), financing decisions by corporations 
(Asquith & Mullins, 1986; Mikkelson & Partch, 1986; Myers & Majluf, 1984),  post-earnings-
announcements (Ball & Bartov, 1996; Ball & Brown, 1968; Bernard & Thomas, 1989; Foster, 
Olsen, & Shevlin, 1984), CEO successions (Beatty & Zajac, 1987; Davidson, Worrell, & Dutia, 
1993; Friedman & Singh, 1989; Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers, & Owers, 1989), and a range of 
other financial considerations (Kothari, 2001; MacKinlay, 1997; C. W. Smith, 1986). 
Moreover, event studies are also used in law, to measure the effect of regulations (Schwert, 
1981) and in cases of insider trading or fraud (Mitchell & Netter, 1994). Some unique but 
notable cases include event studies on celebrity endorsements (Agrawal & Kamakura, 1995) 
and strategic investment decisions (Woolridge & Snow, 1990). Equally vast is the scope of 
literature on event study methodology (Boehmer, Masumeci, & Poulsen, 1991; Brown & 
Warner, 1980; Campbell, Lo, & MacKinlay, 1997; Cowan, 1992; Lyon, Barber, & Tsai, 1999; 
MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
 
A number of event studies also look to topics related to sustainability management, such as the 
impact of inclusion or exclusion from Dow Jones Sustainability World Index (Cheung, 2010), 
or organizational environmental performance (Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996). McWilliams and 
Siegel (1997) further highlight instances of event studies in the field of corporate social 
responsibility, such as instances of affirmative action programs (Wright, Ferris, Hiller, & Kroll, 
1995), plant closings (Clinebell & Clinebell, 1994), and product recall announcements 
(Davidson & Worrel, 1988). Notably, McWilliams and Siegel (1997) highlights that the studies 
on corporate social responsibility cite stakeholder theory to justify the event’s impacts on stock 
prices, which may explain why researchers often use event studies to test theories of corporate 
responsibility. 
 
In much the same way, anti-Apartheid divestment literature also apply the event study model 
to measure the impact of divestment announcements (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997; Meznar, 
Nigh, & Kwok, 1994, 1998; Posnikoff, 1997; Teoh, Welch, & Wazzan, 1999; Wright & Ferris, 
1997). While all studies attempt to answer if a firm’s decision to divest influenced their share 
price, nuances in the design framework as highlighted in McWilliams et al. (1999) has led to 
conflicting results. Of the six studies conducted, three infer that divestment has no impact on 
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share prices (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997; Meznar et al., 1994; Teoh et al., 1999), two studies 
infer a negative impact on share prices (Meznar et al., 1998; Wright & Ferris, 1997), and one 
study infers that divestment announcements have a positive impact on share prices (Posnikoff, 
1997). These conflicting results also warrant further application of event studies in the context 
of the fossil-fuel divestment movement. Three of the six studies explicate the theories applied 
to explain their results. Wright and Ferris (1997) cite agency theory to propose that negative 
excess returns are a manifestation of the agency problem, finding that private and political 
forces rather than value maximization often drive corporate strategies. In contrast, Meznar et 
al. (Meznar et al., 1994) cites that the negative returns realized supports the stakeholder theory 
that managers include the interests of multiple stakeholders when deciding to divest from South 
Africa. Notably, while Posnikoff (1997) does cite the general economic theory, the report 
simply explains that the theory fails to explain why divesting institutions outperformed. The 
methods chapter below delves further into the frameworks that builds this study. 
 
5.1.2 Validity 
The econometric assumptions applied to the model’s design is crucial in shaping the outcome 
of the study (Kothari & Warner, 2004). While the simplicity of the event study methodology 
has led to a vast collection of empirical research on corporate strategy and management, studies 
on the same phenomenon often lead to conflicting results subject to the model’s design 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). The validity of any study is thus, only as credible as the 
assumptions outlined in the methodology. 
 
Event studies are sensitive to variations in research design. McWilliams et al. (1999) exemplify 
how such variations resulted in five conflicting reports on the impact of the anti-Apartheid 
divestment movement, both in the direction and magnitude of abnormal stock price returns. 
These conflicting results are most commonly due to the selection of events, event windows, 
and samples. In addition to the model framework, Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) establish 
that the application and results of event studies depend on strong empirical assumptions to 
ensure statistical validity. Thus, a number of statistical tools have also been used to correct 
statistical or measurement assumptions. The selection of expected return models, abnormal 
returns, and significance tests employed can further mitigate issues such as non-normalization, 
parameter estimations and non synchronous trading, and variance estimations (Brown & 
Warner, 1985). The following section explores how variations in the research design resulted 
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in conflicting findings across event study literature on anti-Apartheid divestment, as 
groundwork to detail the research design for this study.  
 
5.2 The Model Design 
The study’s model design includes explicitly defining and selecting relevant events, event 
windows, and the sample set, in a manner that is unbiased and replicable. In directing this 
study’s design framework, the methods adopted across the anti-Apartheid divestment literature 
will be highlighted.  
 
5.2.1 Define the Event 
The first step to conducting an event studies analysis is to explicitly define the event being 
studied. McWilliams et al. (1999) deduce that unlike traditional applications of event studies 
like mergers and acquisitions or earnings announcements, the interpretation of divestment 
announcements and other announcements of corporate social responsibility can lead to 
inconsistencies across design. A detailed description of the event includes the defining 
characteristics of the event being studied, including a scope of inclusionary and exclusionary 
criteria, date range, and source of event announcement.  
 
5.2.1.1 Defining the Event in anti-Apartheid Divestment Studies 
All six anti-Apartheid divestment studies examined the same issue; the impact of a divestment 
related announcement on a select institution’s stock price. However, the selection of events 
across studies differed due to the inclusionary and exclusionary criteria applied. Some studies 
applied inclusionary criteria, only including events where divestment was voluntary (Teoh et 
al., 1999; Wright & Ferris, 1997) or only including events where the sample firm had complete 
data on financial returns (Posnikoff, 1997). Other studies adopted exclusionary criteria, like 
eliminating firms that do not trade on an American stock exchange (Meznar et al., 1994, 1998) 
or eliminating firms that did not subsequently divest (Teoh et al., 1999).  
 
The selection of events also differed with respect to the range of years accounted and the 
sources of information. Dates in some studies range nearly 20 years from the early 1970s to 
1991 (Meznar et al., 1994, 1998), while other studies are as short as six years, ranging from the 
early to late 1980s (Posnikoff, 1997; Teoh et al., 1999). Date ranges were also divided between 
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earlier and later events, to differentiate performance among early adopters and later 
announcements (Meznar et al., 1994, 1998). Equally important is the source of announcement. 
Notably, all six papers used the Wall Street Journal as one, if not the main source for 
information. McWilliams and Siegel (1997) explain that the Wall Street Journal is an important 
source as a record for financially relevant events, citing events that are perceived to be 
noteworthy to the financial community. Other sources of event announcements include 
newspapers like the New York Times (Meznar et al., 1994; Wright & Ferris, 1997),  divestment 
publications like the Unified List (Posnikoff, 1997), and news and publication databases like 
the Dow Jones News Retrieval service and the Investor Responsibility Research Center (Teoh 
et al., 1999).  
 
5.2.1.2 Defining the Event for the Fossil-fuel Divestment Study 
In the context of this study, events can be defined as announcements related to the fossil-fuel 
divestment movement. The inclusionary criteria for divestment announcements are events of 
institutional pledges to divest any part or whole of their holdings of fossil fuel stock, events of 
endorsements in favour of or encouraging divestment, and events related to divestment 
campaigns that further discourse on the divestment movement. As of June 2016, the Fossil-
Free organization lists 538 pledges, 23 high profile endorsements, and nearly 1000 national 
and local divestment campaigns.  
 
Studying the expanse of these events is out of scope for this study, but can specified by a date 
and source of event. The date range spanned from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2015, to 
capture events as early as the inception of Bill McKibben’s Do the Math campaign (350.org, 
2012) and as recent as the symbolic four-year anniversary of the fossil fuel campaign (Crooks, 
2015). To scope the most relevant events, a three-step process is adopted. First, the study 
limited events to announcements published in the Wall Street Journal or the Financial Times, 
for their financial relevance and frequent application across event study literature (Dyckman, 
Philbrick, & Stephan, 1984). The publications were extracted from the LexisNexis Database. 
Second the study turns to identify publications by groups like Oxford University’s Stranded 
Assets Program, as key drivers in stimulating discourse on fossil-fuel divestment. Finally, the 
study looks to the Google Trends Database, which can be used to chart instances of dates (and 
their relevant announcements) where public discourse surged. This process of scoping the event 
date and source shrunk the list to 119 unique events.  
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To further scope the events, four steps of exclusionary screening are applied to exclude 
irrelevant events. First, publications of general reference (i.e. fossil-fuel divestment is…) or 
publications that do not include new information are excluded. Second, duplicate publications 
referencing a common event (i.e. Wall Street Journal’s ‘Rockefeller Fund Seeks to Shed Fossil-
Fuel Investments’ and the Financial Times’ ‘Rockefellers join anti-fossil fuel drive’ 
duplication) are excluded, except for the first and earliest publication. Third, announcements 
of piecewise developments or calls to action (i.e. ‘Fossil-fuel divestment discussion moves 
toward Board’ or ‘Swedish pensions urged to dump fossil fuels’) are excluded. Finally, 
rejections (i.e. Financial Times’ ‘Edinburgh University angers fossil-fuel divestment 
campaigners’ publication) are excluded. 
 
Table 1: Divestment Events 
Divestment Pledges 
2013-05-14 Kissel, M. (2013). Opinion: Swarthmore Under Student Siege. Wall Street Journal. 
2014-05-06 Crooks, E. (2014). Stanford endowment votes to sell coal mining shares. Financial Times. 
2014-07-11 Vaughan, A. (2014) World Council of Churches rules out fossil fuel investments. The Guardian. 
2014-06-25 Medact. (2014). UK Doctors Vote to End Investments in the Fossil Fuel Industry. 
2014-09-22 Calia, M. (2014). Rockefeller Fund Seeks to Shed Fossil-Fuel Investments. Wall Street 
Journal. 
2014-10-07 Smyth, J. (2014). Australian pension fund LGS drops coal assets. Financial Times. 
2014-10-08 Brooks, L. (2014) Glasgow becomes first university in Europe to divest from fossil fuels. The 
Guardian. 
2014-11-23 Marriage, M. (2014) Norway’s largest pension fund vows to drop coal mine holdings. 
Financial Times. 
2015-04-01 Mance, H & Clark, P. (2015). Guardian Media Group to sell shares linked to fossil fuels. 
Financial Times. 
2015-04-30 Clark, P. (2015). Church of England blacklists coal and tar sands investments. Financial 
Times. 
2015-05-18 Clark, P. (2015). University of Oxford to spurn coal and tar sands investments. Financial 
Times.  
2015-06-23 Lutheran World Federation. (2015). LWF announces decision not to invest in fossil fuels. 
LWF.  
2015-10-20 Carrington, D. (2015). Oslo divests from coal companies. The Guardian. 
Divestment Endorsements 
2013-05-01 Klein, N. (2013). Naomi Klein: Time for Big Green to Go Fossil Free. The Nation. 
2014-04-10 Tutu, D. (2014). Desmond Tutu: We need an apartheid-style boycott to save the planet. The 
Guardian.  
2014-08-06 Gore, A & Blood, D. (2014). Strong economic case for coal divestment. Financial Times.  
2014-11-04 Ki-moon, B. (2014) Ban Ki Moon Endorses Fossil Fuel Divestment. UNFCCC. 
2015-03-15 Carrington, D. (2015). Climate change: UN backs fossil fuel divestment campaign. The 
Guardian. 
Divestment Campaigns 
2012-09-19 350.org (2012). Do the Math: We’re jumpstarting a new movement, and we need your help. 
350.org. 
2013-10-07 Ansar, A., Caldecott, B., & Tilbury, J. (2013). Stranded assets and the fossil-fuel divestment 
campaign: what does divestment mean for the valuation of fossil fuel assets. Stranded Asset 
Program, SSEE, University of Oxford. 
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2014-08-25 Bullard, N. (2014). Fossil-fuel divestment: a $5 trillion challenge. Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance. 
2014-09-19 Foderaro, LW. (2014). New York Climate March: Taking a Call for Climate Change to the 
Streets. New York Times.  
2015-02-12 Mathiesen, K; Howard, E; & Shabbir, N. (2015). Global Divestment Day: 'We are ready for 
urgent action on climate change'. The Guardian. 
2015-09-22 Crooks, E. (2015). Funds worth $2.6tn pledge to dump coal. Financial Times. 
 
 
In much the same process of identifying divestment announcements, the study also identifies a 
set of events related to stranded assets and the carbon budget, as a means to compare the impact 
of divestment announcements to related developments. Events selected are instances of 
increased public discourse on the environmental risks of fossil fuel companies, in regard to the 
topics of stranded assets or the carbon budget. The selection of events are as follows.  
 
Table 2: Carbon Budget  and Stranded Asset Events 
Carbon Budget Events 
2012-07-19 McKibben, B. (2012). Global Warming's Terrifying New Math. Rolling Stone.  
2012-10-30 Leggett, J. (2012). Carbon bubble is a real risk for markets. Financial Times. 
2013-06-25 White House, The. Obama’s Remarks on Climate Change. The White House. 
2013-10-29 Gore, A & Blood, D. (2013). The Coming Carbon Asset Bubble. Wall Street Journal.  
2014-04-24 Lewis, MC. (2014). Stranded Assets, Fossilised Revenues. Kepler Cheuvreux. 
2014-09-29 Ritter, B. (2014). Let's Act Before the Oil Bubble Bursts. Wall Street Journal.  
2015-01-12 Meyer, N & Brinker L. (2015). The Myth of the Carbon Investment ‘Bubble’. Wall Street 
Journal. 
2015-01-19 Kirk, S & Bansal, R. (2015). Peak carbon before peak oil. Deutsche Bank.  
2015-03-12 Clark P. (2015). Global carbon emissions stall in 2014. Financial Times.  
2015-05-25 Pope Francis. (2015). Encyclical Letter, Laudato Si’ of the Holy Father Francis on Care for 
our Common Home. The Holy See. 
Stranded Asset Events 
2012-05-07 Scott, M. (2012). Focus falls on asset owners' climate risks. Financial Times.  
2012-11-12 Birol, F, et al. (2012). IEA World Energy Outlook 2012. International Energy Agency. 
2013-04-18 Leaton, J., Ranger, N., Ward, B., Sussams, L., & Brown, M. (2013). Unburnable Carbon 
2013: Wasted capital and stranded assets. Carbon Tracker Initiative. 
2013-08-30 IPCC. (2014). Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II 
and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
IPCC. 
2014-09-22 United Nations. (2014). UN Climate Summit 2014: At Climate Summit, UN is practicing what 
it preaches. United Nations.  
2014-11-27 Faucon, B; Said, S; & Kent, S. (2014) Oil Prices Plunge After OPEC Stays Put. Wall Street 
Journal.  
2015-04-16 Paum, A. (2015). Stranded assets: what next? HSBC Global Research.  
2015-04-27 Poulter, J. (2015). World’s Largest Investors Continue to Gamble on Climate Risk: Asset 
Owners Disclosure Project.  
2015-05-06 Denning, L. (2015). Big Oil’s Disruptive Climate Change. Wall Street Journal.  
2015-09-29 Carney, M. (2015). Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon. Bank of England.  
2015-12-16 UNFCCC. (2015). Paris Pledge for Action Boosts Paris Climate Agreement. UNFCCC. 
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5.2.2 Define the Event Windows 
Announcements must be tested for event date accuracy and managed for confounding and 
clustering effects. Event date accuracy refers to the process of identifying the earliest instance 
of disclosure of new information. Generally, the event study method assumes that new 
information is unanticipated, however the earliest instance of disclosure may be difficult to 
identify for divestment announcements where decisions are achieved after lengthy public 
debate. The decision to divest from South Africa could often be anticipated, coming “at the end 
of lengthy debates within firms and between firms and particular stakeholder groups... Thus, 
information that a firm was considering pulling out of South Africa may often have been 
available well ahead of the announcement itself” (Meznar et al., 1994, p. 1640). In such cases, 
a long event window that captures price effects prior to and after the announcement date or 
statistical tests that control for contemporaneous market returns can isolate the event response 
(MacKinlay, 1997). Long event windows however, can be influenced by extraneous 
confounding and clustering events. This section attempts to evaluate the preference for long 
event windows while controlling for other relevant events. 
 
5.2.2.1 Defining the Event Window in anti-Apartheid Divestment Studies 
Adopting a long event window is one solution to internalize the impacts of information leakage 
and speculation. Posnikoff (1997) adopted the shortest event window, spanning one day prior 
to and one day after the event. Meznar et al. (1994) comparably adopted the longest event 
window, over 41 days. Wright and Ferris (1997) adopted single day event windows for up to 
ten days prior to and up to ten days after the divestment announcement. However, while long 
event windows are useful when announcements may be anticipated prior to the announcement 
date, the longer the event window the greater the probability that actual returns may be affected 
by other significant events. 
 
External firm specific or industry wide events weaken the validity that abnormal returns are 
strictly in response to the event being studied (McWilliams et al., 1999). Confounding events 
influence select firms, from announcements related to dividends, mergers, new products, or 
unexpected earnings (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997) or from non-sample spillovers from 
competing firms (McWilliams et al., 1999). Brown and Warner (1985) infer that confounding 
events are most problematic for studies with small sample sizes and long event windows, 
however a long event window can be appropriate if the sample size is large. Three of the six 
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studies on anti-Apartheid divestment address confounding events (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997; 
Meznar et al., 1998; Wright & Ferris, 1997), however, the short three day event windows 
adopted by Wright and Ferris (1997) and Mcwilliams and Siegel (1997)  do not raise concerns 
of confounding effects. The study by Meznar et al. (1998) on the other hand does raise 
significant concerns, because the study only addresses confounding events for days -1 and 0 
across its 41 day long event window and relatively small sample size.  
 
Clustering events of industry wide announcements may impact multiple firms in a related 
industry. Thus, sample sets that share a common industry may be more sensitive to extraneous 
events as errors in excess returns are correlated among a large set of clustered firms 
(McWilliams et al., 1999). This makes it challenging to isolate the impact of the pertinent event, 
when stock price changes can be introduced from external market or industry factors. Much 
like confounding events, Brown and Warner (1985) infer that a large sample size and short 
event window can adequately control for industry effects, however for an industry specific 
sample set as in the case of fossil-fuel divestment, industry effects must be controlled. Two of 
the six anti-Apartheid divestment studies address clustering events (Posnikoff, 1997; Teoh et 
al., 1999). Posnikoff (1997) highlights that statistical tools like the ordinary cross sectional t-
test can be adopted where event date clustering may exist (Boehmer et al., 1991). Conversely, 
Teoh et al. (1999) incorporates an industry factor into a custom market-model type regression 
to isolate clustering impacts. 
 
5.2.2.2 Defining the Event Windows for the Fossil-fuel Divestment Study 
This study reviews the events highlighted above to ensure that the dates cited are the earliest 
instances when information about the event reaches the market. However, even if the exact 
date can be isolated, speculation prior to or lagging outcomes post event can lead to 
inaccuracies (MacKinlay, 1997). Longer event windows can capture the effects of speculation 
or lagging response however expose the study to extraneous influences.  
 
Confounding effects that impact sample firms individually can be masked with a large sample 
size. Clustering effects however, are more problematic for this study, because the sample firms 
share a common industry. Clustering effects can be mitigated by excluding events with industry 
events within the event window or by averaging the event windows of all events together to 
mask outlying influences. The impact of clustering events can also be mitigated by including 
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an industry variable in the select expected return models (Collins & Dent, 1984), however since 
the purpose of the study is to test the impact of divestment on the industry as a whole, the 
inclusion of an industry variable may depress the excess returns and lead to a false negative 
type II error.  
 
The event window adopted is a combination of short one-day and long multi-day event 
windows.  Single day windows, as structured by Wright and Ferris (1997) present greater 
statistical power than multi-day windows. This study will thus adopt a single day event window 
for up to ten days prior to and up to ten days after the event date. This will be complemented 
by a series of longer multi-day event windows, to internalize instances of speculation and to 
measure the longer term influence of the divestment event (MacKinlay, 1997). The study 
adopts four windows, spanning 1, 2, 5, and 10 days around the event. 
 
5.2.3 Define the Sample 
After defining the exogenous events and associated windows, the design framework turns to 
the endogenous sample. Sample sets are collected for the firm selections and control factors. 
Sample selection and size are important considerations for design and statistical validity; 
differences in sample selection and sample size among the anti-Apartheid divestment event 
studies led to inconsistent results (McWilliams et al., 1999).  
 
5.2.3.1 Defining the Sample in anti-Apartheid Divestment Studies 
The literature on event studies examined, highlights the steps taken to identify the sample set 
of firms, control variables, and their associated financial data. First, of an initial population of 
207 firms that had divested from South African operations (Meznar et al., 1994), sample sets 
ranged from as large as 46 firms (Teoh et al., 1999), to as little as seven (Meznar et al., 1998) 
or even zero, in the case of a 41 day long event windows with no confounding events 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Results from a small sample is problematic however, not only 
because small samples exacerbate the influence of outliers and statistical issues around 
normality, but also because small samples cannot be extrapolated to infer trends across the 
larger population.  
 
Once the sample of firms is identified, the researcher turns to collecting the stock price returns, 
which are used as endogenous variables in the study. While there has been considerable 
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discourse on the use of daily versus monthly returns (Brown & Warner, 1980, 1985; Dyckman 
et al., 1984; Morse, 1984), the use of daily returns data has become more prevalent for its more 
precise measurements (Kothari & Warner, 2004). The event studies conducted for the anti-
Apartheid divestment movement all collected daily adjusted returns for each of the firms 
assessed. Three of the studies explicitly state that daily observed returns are collected from the 
Center for Research in Security (CRSP) database (Posnikoff, 1997; Teoh et al., 1999; Wright 
& Ferris, 1997). The study by Teoh et al. (1999) further explicates that the CSRP can also 
provide financial data for the market and industry factors for expected return models. Risk free 
rates like the one-year treasury bills adopted by Teoh et al. (1999) are obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Historical Business Day Database. 
 
5.2.3.2 Defining the Sample for the Fossil-fuel Divestment Study 
The sample set of selected firms is a representative fraction of the larger population. First, the 
larger population is most broadly defined as publicly listed coal, oil, and gas companies; 
nationally owned corporations are out of scope for this study. The sample of publicly listed 
companies studied are adopted from the Carbon Underground 200 (Alexeyev et al., 2015); an 
initiative by Fossil Free Indexes that ranks the top 100 coal and top 100 oil and gas companies 
by the potential carbon emissions content of their reported reserves. This selection of sample 
firms is justified as an adequate representation of the larger population, as the largest 
corporations account for the largest share of potential production and emissions (Heede, 2014). 
Moreover, the Carbon Underground 200 sample of corporations envelop 98 percent of coal 
reserves, 98 percent of gas reserves, and 97 percent of oil reserves held by listed companies 
(Alexeyev et al., 2015). The sample size of 200 firms is sufficiently large enough to suppress 
idiosyncratic influence of individual firms and strengthen the power of statistical tests. 
Subsamples can be further narrowed by industry classification or geographical location; 
however, these discrepancies will be out of scope for this study. Finally, this study adopts the 
MSCI all-country world index as the exogenous proxy for expected returns and the US 1-year 
treasury rate as the risk free rate of return.  
 
Stock returns are collected from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) platform, which 
hosts the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database of daily stock prices. End of 
day returns are adjusted for the effects of stock splits, mergers, and dividends. Valued weighted 
indexes are collected for the MSCI market index, as it most accurately reflect market 
41 
performance (Ohlson & Rosenberg, 1982). Raw financial returns cannot be easily compared 
given different market sizes and currencies, thus, all outputs are normalized as continuously 
compounded returns, to best conform to normality assumptions (Fama, 1976). 
 
5.3 The Statistical Design 
The statistical design introduced in this section complements the model design as highlighted 
above. Much in the same way anti-Apartheid divestment event studies share a common goal 
but differing design frameworks, nuances in the statistical frameworks can also lead to 
conflicting outcomes (McWilliams et al., 1999). These differences come from the choice of 
expected return models, the abnormal return aggregations, and the statistical tests applied. The 
following section first looks to literature to understand when different statistical frameworks 
may be more appropriate than others. 
 
The expected returns commonly adopted are the mean returns approach (Meznar et al., 1998; 
Posnikoff, 1997; Teoh et al., 1999), the ordinary least squares approach (Posnikoff, 1997), 
custom multi-factor frameworks of the traditional market model (Teoh et al., 1999), and the 
capital asset pricing model (Wright & Ferris, 1997). Cable and Holland (1999) describe how 
these models of expected returns compare. The abnormal returns are most simply calculated as 
the difference between expected and actual returns, but can be specified for factors like 
normalization (standardized abnormal returns), temporal averages over specified event 
windows (cumulative abnormal returns) and cross-sectional averages across the sample set 
(average abnormal returns) (McWilliams et al., 1999). Finally, the significance tests applied 
span from the most simple t-test (Teoh et al., 1999; Wright & Ferris, 1997), to more complex 
tools like cross-sectional tests (Posnikoff, 1997), and non-parametric binomial Z-scores 
(Meznar et al., 1994, 1998; Wright & Ferris, 1997). In directing this study’s statistical 
framework, issues that arise from the design of expected and abnormal returns and statistical 
tests will be addressed and mitigated. 
 
5.3.1 Expected Returns 
A number of simplistic and more complex approaches are available to calculate the expected 
return of a given security; this subsection highlights some of the most commonly applied tools. 
Event studies generally adopted a 200 to 250-day estimation period for all expected return 
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models. The choice of method applied is dependent on the design approach and its ability to 
effectively isolate the abnormal returns of an event.  
 
5.3.1.1 Expected in anti-Apartheid Divestment Studies 
The first and simplest method to calculate expected returns is the mean return model. This 
method simply calculates the average rate of return for a specific security, over a predetermined 
estimation period. This method is applied by studies by Posnikoff (1997), Meznar et al. (1998), 
and Teoh et al. (1999) in the context of anti-Apartheid divestment. Brown and Warner (1980, 
1985) demonstrate that this relatively simplistic model often yields results similar to those of 
more sophisticated models, however their results are under the assumption that the study adopts 
short event windows.  
 
The market model calculates expected returns from an external market index, rather than the 
specific security. Proponents of the market model attest that isolating variations in market 
returns can more effectively separate the effects of events studied (MacKinlay, 1997). Market 
proxies can be broad like the S&P 500 index (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997), or a sample-
specific like the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) industrial index as a proxy for the South 
African Market (Teoh et al., 1999). Variations on the market model, such as the market adjusted 
returns model (Cable & Holland, 1999) and the market and risk adjusted models (Brown & 
Warner, 1980) are respectively applied in instances where estimation windows are not feasible 
or where risk induced variance is high. Brown and Warner (1985) further specify that in the 
presence of non-synchronous trading, the ordinary least squares (OLS) market regression 
model can further mitigate biases in returns. Finally, multi-factor models allow researchers to 
internalize variations in stock prices, to increase the explanatory power of abnormal returns 
(MacKinlay, 1997). Custom market models such as that adopted by adopted by Teoh et al. 
(1999) for example can control for market, industry, and risk factors together.  
 
Economic models are generally more complex multi-factor models to more precisely calculate 
expected normal returns. One prevalent macroeconomic multifactor model in event studies is 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which extends the market model to  price securities 
by both the market and market risk (MacKinlay, 1997).  
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5.3.1.2 Expected Returns for the Fossil-fuel Divestment Study 
This study applied CAPM as the primary expected returns model. It will adopt the MSCI all-
country world index and 1 year US treasury price over an estimation window of 250 trading 
days prior to the event window. The expected returns model will mitigate instances of non-
normality by adopting the logarithmic continuous compounding returns. Finally, the market 
OLS model will be cross referenced to the CAPM as a robustness check for instances of serial 
correlation and nonsynchronous trading (Lo & MacKinlay, 1990). The capital asset pricing 
model can be calculated as; 
 
 
 
Where the expected return of security i on day t “E(Ri,t)” is dependent on risk premium rate of 
return, calculated as the difference between the market index “Rm,t” and a risk free index 
“Rf,t”.  
 
5.3.2 Abnormal Returns 
The abnormal return (AR) is simply defined as the difference between the expected and actual 
return of a given firm on the event day. Three modifications to the AR include standardization, 
time series aggregation, and cross sectional aggregation. 
 
5.3.2.1 Abnormal Returns in anti-Apartheid Divestment Studies 
The simple abnormal return calculates the difference between expected and realized returns, 
but only calculates abnormal returns for one security at a time, only accounts for a one trading 
day, and does not address distributional errors. Cross-sectional aggregation can combine 
abnormal returns of multiple firms in a sample to one average abnormal return (AAR). Time 
series aggregation can extend the event window by combining abnormal returns of a firm over 
many days, to one cumulative abnormal return (CAR). Together, abnormal returns can be 
aggregated to a cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR). Furthermore, a standardized 
abnormal return (SAR) divides the residuals by its standard error, to normalize the data (Dodd 
and Warner, 1983). With the exception of Wright and Ferris (1997), anti-Apartheid event 
studies literature most commonly compute standardized abnormal returns. 
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5.3.2.2 Abnormal Returns for the Fossil-fuel Divestment Study 
This study applied the standardized abnormal return (SAR) as the primary calculation for 
abnormal returns. The standardized abnormal returns are however also compounded across 
firms (standardized average abnormal return) and over time (standardized cumulative abnormal 
returns), as required by the choice of statistical tests applied. The standardized abnormal return 
normalizes the abnormal returns by dividing the abnormal return by its standard error, 
calculated as follows; 
 
 
 
Where, “SARi,E” is the standardized abnormal return of one security ‘i’ on event day ‘E’, 
calculated by the abnormal return (ARi,E) divided by the standard deviation of the abnormal 
return adjusted for forecast errors. 
 
5.3.3 Tests for Statistical Significance 
The standardized abnormal returns calculated above must be vetted to be statistically 
significant. To do so, several test statistics can be applied, depending on choice of aggregation 
and the assumptions of probability distributions. This section first examines the differences in 
test statistics between independent, standardized, time aggregated, and cross sectional tests. 
While these tests depend on distributional assumptions, nonparametric tests can be applied in 
instances where these assumptions are not defined. 
 
5.3.3.1 Significance Tests in anti-Apartheid Divestment Studies 
The first and most simple test statistic is the t-test as applied by Wright and Ferris (1997). The 
t-test is simply the ratio of the mean excess return for one firm on the event day to its estimated 
standard deviation, but raises concerns of cross-sectional correlation among firms on the event 
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day and of event induced volatility over multiple days. Both errors understate the standard 
deviation, overstate the t-statistic, and lead to a type I incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis. 
In turn, the simple t-test has relatively low statistical power. 
 
A cross-sectional adjusted t-test, as adopted by Posnikoff (1997), is used to calculate the 
significance of average abnormal returns across a portfolio by dividing the average residual by 
a cross-sectional standard deviation. The test however, implicitly assumes that abnormal 
returns are uncorrelated and event-induced volatility is insignificant (Brown & Warner, 1985).  
 
In the event that announcements are correlated, because they share the same calendar date or 
are from the same industry, standardized returns can be used (Armitage, 1995). Tests of 
standardized returns are commonly used in anti-Apartheid literature (Meznar et al., 1994, 1998; 
Wright & Ferris, 1997), for their greater statistical power (Boehmer et al., 1991; Kolari & 
Pynnönen, 2010; MacKinlay, 1997). The standardized Patell (1976) adjusted test for instance 
controls for heteroscedastic effects between estimation and event windows to adjust for cross-
correlation, however the model assumes that event induced variance is insignificant. Boehmer 
et al.’s (1991) standardized cross-sectional (BMP) test, builds on Patell’s adjusted test, to 
incorporate variance from both the estimation and the event periods into abnormal returns. 
More recently, Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) introduce an adjusted standardized residual test 
and adjusted BMP test to adjust for cross-correlation between the market and securities. 
 
Nonparametric tests are free of assumptions regarding the distribution of returns and are as 
such, perceived to be more powerful tests where distributional assumptions can not be made 
(Dutta, 2014). The most common nonparametric tests adopted in event studies are the sign test 
and the rank test (MacKinlay, 1997). The general sign test, as introduced by Cowan (1992), 
measures the proportion of the sample with positive or negative performance greater than or 
less than 50 percent, and can be applied in instances where the cumulative abnormal return 
could be either positive or negative (MacKinlay, 1997). The sign test is useful to address for 
skewness in returns (Dutta, 2014). The rank test, as introduced by Corrado (1989) transforms 
the distribution of abnormal returns to a uniform ranked distribution, which mitigates issues of 
asymmetry in the initial distribution. Typically, nonparametric and parametric tests are best 
applied together; nonparametric tests can check for robustness in the conclusions of parametric 
tests (MacKinlay, 1997). 
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5.3.3.2 Significance Tests for the Fossil-fuel Divestment Study 
This study adopts the standardized cross-sectional (BMP) test as the primary significance test. 
Standardized tests are preferential to traditional parametric tests for their statistical power and 
wider applicability in instances of cross-sectional correlation and event induced volatility. 
Standardized parametric tests are also preferential to non-parametric tests when the abnormal 
returns are normalized and continuous. The cross-sectional BMP test is preferential to Patell’s 
(1976) standardized residual test for its ability to better account for cross-sectional and event-
induced variance across a sample set, which is important when the sample shares common 
event days or a common industry. Finally, Kolari and Pynnönen’s (2010) adjusted BMP test 
can depress the test statistic in instances where the market and security are correlated, as in the 
case of the fossil fuel industry. Nevertheless, other tests including the cross-sectional t-test, 
crude dependence test, Patell test, and sign test will also be conducted as robustness checks, to 
test for conflicting results. Thus, the standardized cross-sectional BMP test will be the primary 
significance test and will be formulated as; 
 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion and Next Steps 
The purpose of this chapter was to detail the piecewise process adopted to conduct this study. 
The event study method is commonly used for its simplicity and applicability; however, the 
validity of results heavily relies on the assumptions made. Most notably, the researcher’s 
methodology dictates their choice of events to be studied, the range of event windows, and the 
endogenous sample set utilized. The calculations for the expected returns model, the abnormal 
returns, and the statistical tests utilized also play an important role in ensuring the results are 
valid. Thus, this chapter lays the groundwork for this study in a manner that is both valid and 
replicable. The next chapter presents the results of the study.  
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the event study results, to assess the impact of divestment and related 
events on the stock performance of listed fossil fuel companies. The results indicate that 
divestment events have a statistically significant negative abnormal return on the event day. 
This suggests that the market perceives divestment events as material to the fossil fuel 
industry’s share valuation. The results also indicate that events related to stranded assets or the 
carbon budget do have a statistically significant negative abnormal return, however there is no 
evidence to suggest that divestment events have a greater negative impact on the industry. This 
suggests that the market perceives all stakeholder pressures on divestment, stranded assets, and 
the carbon budget equally influential to the fossil fuel industry.  
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6.1 Hypothesis One 
The first research question asks, do divestment events impact the share price of listed fossil 
fuel companies? The null hypothesis stands that there will be no abnormal stock price reaction 
because the market does not perceive divestment events to have measurable valuation 
consequences. The alternate hypothesis infers that divestment events negatively influence the 
share price of fossil fuel stocks. This is justified by the efficient market hypothesis, that markets 
perceive new information about divestment as a relevant threat to the industry and adjust prices 
accordingly.  
 
6.1.1 Aggregate Results of Divestment Events 
The first test examines the aggregate stock returns of 22 overlapping event announcements 
between 2012 and 2015. The average abnormal returns (AAR) span over a ±10-day event 
window and across a sample size of 199 firms. The cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) span over one, two, five, and ten days surrounding the event date. The capital asset 
pricing model is adopted to calculate expected returns and the standardized cross-sectional 
BMP test is used to test for statistical significance. The fundamental statistics show that the 
mean and median returns are zero, the standard deviation is approximately 0.011, and the 
distribution of the sample is leptokurtic and slightly skewed to the left. 
 
6.1.1.1 Testing Aggregate Results of Divestment Events 
The evidence from table one indicates that on average, fossil fuel shares did have a statistically 
significant negative response on the event day. There is also some indication that shares began 
to respond to divestment up to 3 days prior to the event, which may be indicative of speculative 
behaviour, however these results are not statistically significant. Moreover, there is some 
indication that shares continued to decline for a majority of days after the event, however these 
results are not statistically significant either. In contrast, the cumulative abnormal returns 
indicate that together, there is a statistically significant negative response for the one-day, two-
day, and five-day event windows, suggesting that the impacts of divestment span wider than 
the event day itself. According to the efficient markets hypothesis, the negative response 
explains that markets do perceive divestment events to be a material risk to the performance of 
the fossil fuel industry. Cumulative abnormal returns can be plotted to better visualize the 
performance of fossil fuel stocks during instances of a divestment event. 
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Table 3: Aggregate Statistical Test of Divestment Events 
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6.1.1.2 Plotting Aggregate Returns 
The evidence below highlights the decoupling of fossil fuel shares away from the MSCI market 
index. The figure draws the relationship of the industry and market across the estimation 
window (-260,-11), the event window (-10,10), and the post event window (11,260). Figure 
one attests to the results above, that fossil fuel shares begin their decline as early as three days 
prior to the event and continues its decline across the one-year post-event window as well. This 
suggests that divestment events may have long term consequences for fossil fuel stocks.  
 
Figure 1: Aggregate Plot of Divestment Events 
 
 
6.1.2 Independent Results of Divestment Events 
The next test examines the individual stock returns of each event announcement. The 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for one, two, five, and ten days surrounding the 
event date, the capital asset pricing model is adopted to infer expected returns, and the 
standardized cross-sectional BMP test is used to test for statistical significance. The 
fundamental statistics show that the mean and median returns are zero, the standard deviation 
deviates between 0.009 and 0.015, the skewness between -0.22 and 0.07 and the kurtosis 
between 2.86 and 6.66. The sample size spans from 197 to 199. 
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6.1.2.1 Testing Independent Results 
The evidence from table two indicates that many but not all divestment events are influential. 
Two main findings can be extrapolated, first that some events prove to be more influential than 
others and second that there is a tipping point at which divestment events seem to have longer 
term impacts on fossil fuel stocks. 
 
Table 4: Independent Statistical Test of Divestment Events 
 
 
Of the selected events, the most influential events fell around the third weekend of September 
2014, which not only included the New York People’s Climate March, the Rockefeller Fund’s 
divestment announcement, and over 700 independent pledges to divest from fossil fuels 
(Divest-Invest, 2014), but also the 2014 UN climate summit. In contrast, the least influential 
events include the Global Divestment Day campaign and the Guardian Media Group’s 
divestment announcement, which posted positive abnormal returns across all cumulative 
windows. Other less influential events include social rights activist Desmond Tutu’s 
endorsement, Stanford University’s divestment pledge, Glasgow University’s divestment 
pledge, and UN secretary general Ban Ki-Moon’s endorsement. Other Notable cases include 
social activist Naomi Klein’s endorsement, and Swarthmore College’s divestment pledge, 
which noted a statistically significant negative response across the ±1-day event window before 
rising back up thereafter. The second major finding is that events after September 19, 2014 
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seemed to not only be more influential but also had longer term implications spanning as far as 
±10 days around the event day, which might indicate a shift in the investors’ perception of 
divestment events.  
 
6.1.2.2 Plotting Independent Returns 
The evidence below attests that not all divestment events have been influential. The figure 
draws the relationship of each independent event on the industry relative to the MSCI market 
index, across the estimation window (-260,-11), the event window (-10,10), and the post event 
window (11,260). The independent results are shaded in gradient to differentiate between early 
events (lighter) and later events (darker) and notable events are thickened to visualize the range 
of variation.  
 
First, figure two shows that while many events had a negative response on the day of or 
surrounding the event date, other events had little to no response all together. Events such as 
the Global Divestment Day campaign or Guardian Media Group for example seem to 
outperform the market on the days of and leading up to the event. Recognizably, this does not 
mean that events which saw an outperformance in the market index saw positive returns on 
that day as well, since the trend lines are held relative to the MSCI average. Secondly, the 
figure attests to the notion that early divestment events generally seem to be less influential 
than later divestment events. Finally, the figure shows that the majority of events weakened the 
share price beyond the event window and into the post-event window as well.  
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Figure 2: Plot of Independent Divestment Events 
 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The aggregate results infer that there is a statistically significant negative response on the event 
day. The results also infer that the impacts of a divestment event carry beyond the event date, 
resulting in sustained underperformance of the industry through the post-event window. 
Finally, the independent results infer that later events may have been more influential than 
earlier ones in impacting firms across a longer event window. 
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Divestment related events do have a statistically significant response on the event date. Thus, 
the null hypothesis that divestment has no impact on fossil fuel shares can be rejected. 
However, outcomes may differ when samples are subcategorized and events are grouped. For 
instance, figure three shows that sub-samples of coal stocks underperform relative to oil and 
gas stocks, and sub-samples of firms on Asian markets outperform while firms in the Americas 
underperform. Moreover, events of pledges and campaigns are more influential than 
endorsements in the long run and later events tend to underperform relative to early events. 
While the statistical analysis of these variations is not in scope for this study, the visual 
representations do indicate the discrepancies and pose opportunities for future research.  
 
Figure 3: Grouping Samples and Events 
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6.2 Hypothesis Two 
The second research question asks, are divestment events more influential than events related 
to the carbon budget and stranded assets? The null hypothesis stands that there is no difference 
between divestment events or events of stranded assets or carbon budgets, on fossil fuel share 
prices. This is because the market perceives similar events to have relatively equal valuation 
consequences. The alternate hypothesis infers that events related to stranded assets or the 
carbon budget will have a lesser effect on share prices. This is because under the perspective 
of stakeholder theory, divestment pursued by more salient shareholders have a greater direct 
impact than discourse on stranded assets and the carbon budget, which is pursued by 
stakeholders who do not have a direct impact on share price.  
 
6.2.1 Aggregate Results of Related Events 
The first test examines the aggregate stock returns of 21 overlapping event announcements on 
stranded assets or the carbon budget between 2012 and 2015. The average abnormal returns 
(AAR) span over a ±10-day event window and across a sample size of 198 firms. The 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) span over one, two, five, and ten days 
surrounding the event date. The capital asset pricing model is adopted to infer expected returns 
and the standardized cross-sectional BMP test is used to test for statistical significance. The 
fundamental statistics show that the mean and median returns are zero, the standard deviation 
is approximately 0.011, and the distribution of the sample is leptokurtic and slightly skewed to 
the left. 
 
6.2.1.1 Testing Aggregate Results 
The evidence from table three indicates that on average, fossil fuel shares did have a statistically 
significant negative response across one day prior, after, and the day of the event. There is also 
some indication that shares began to respond to events as early as 10 days prior to the event, 
which may be indicative of speculative behaviour, however these results are not statistically 
significant. Comparably, the cumulative abnormal returns indicate a statistically significant 
negative response for the one-day, two-day, and five-day, and 10-day event windows, 
suggesting that the impacts of discourse on stranded assets and carbon budgets also span 
beyond the event day. According to the stakeholder theory, the negative response justifies that 
markets perceive discourse among stakeholders to be a material risk to the performance of the 
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fossil fuel industry, even if the stakeholders have no direct influence on share price as in the 
case of divestment events. Cumulative abnormal returns can be plotted to better visualize the 
performance of fossil fuel stocks during instances of a divestment event. 
 
Table 5: Aggregate Statistical Test of Stranded Asset and Carbon Budget Event 
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6.2.1.2 Plotting Aggregate Returns 
The evidence highlights the underperformance of fossil fuel shares in the presence of select 
stranded assets and carbon budget events across the estimation window, the event window, and 
the post event window. Figure four indicates that while share prices began a steep decline as 
early as six days prior to the event date, the decline closely follows the market index, which 
also fell during the days preceding the event. Notably however, the decline among fossil fuel 
shares is steeper for days surrounding the event. Finally, the figure indicates that the fossil fuel 
shares rise over the days after the event, suggesting a market correction as shares are 
repurchased at a lower price. Nevertheless, the impact of stranded asset and carbon budget 
events seem to lead to sustained underperformance of the industry well into the post-event 
window. Thus, the results suggest that events related to stranded assets and the carbon budget 
do depress fossil fuel shares across both the event and post-event window. 
 
Figure 4: Plot of Independent Stranded Asset and Carbon Budget Event 
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6.2.2 Independent Results of Related Events 
The next test examines the individual stock returns of each event announcement included 
above. The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for one, two, five, and ten days 
surrounding the event date, the capital asset pricing model is adopted to infer expected returns, 
and the standardized cross-sectional BMP test is used to test for statistical significance. The 
fundamental statistics show that the mean and median returns are zero, the standard deviation 
deviates between 0.009 and 0.016, the skewness between -0.31 and 0.19 and the kurtosis 
between 2.54 and 6.38. The sample size spans from 196 to 199. 
 
6.2.2.1 Testing Independent Results 
The evidence from Table four indicates that the majority of selected events are influential in 
depressing fossil fuel share prices. Ten of the 21 events have statistically significant negative 
returns across all four sets of event windows. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most influential 
events include OPEC’s announcement to maintain oil production levels which consequently 
led to a fall in oil prices and the 2014 UN climate summit which complemented the New York 
Climate march and the Rockefeller Fund’s divestment pledge. Curiously, the introduction of 
the Asset Owners Disclosure Project (AODP), Barack Obama’s remarks on climate change, 
the IEA World Energy Outlook publication are also highly influential events. In contrast the 
least influential events were the AODP 2015 Global Climate publication, the HSBC ‘Stranded 
Assets: What’s Next’ publication, and the IPCC Fifth Assessment publication, all of which 
were insignificant across all cumulative ranges. Some surprisingly weaker events include Mark 
Carney’s Tragedy of the Horizon speech and the UNFCCC COP21 event. 
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Table 6: Independent Statistical Tests of Stranded Asset and Carbon Budget Events 
 
 
6.2.2.2 Plotting Independent Returns 
The evidence across independent events once again attests that not all stranded asset or carbon 
budget events are equally influential. Results are mapped relative to the MSCI market index 
and graded in chronological order (from lighter to darker) across the estimation window, the 
event window, and the post event window. Figure 5 indicates that while the majority of events 
experienced a negative response on the day of or surrounding the event, ten of the 21 events 
rallied up to a level where fossil fuel returns outperformed the MSCI market index over the 
post-event window. As attested to above, the most influential event was the OPEC 
announcement, while the least influential events were the HSBC stranded assets publication 
and the AODP global climate publication announcements. One notable case is Mark Carney’s 
‘Tragedy of the Horizon’ speech, which declined prior to the event day but adjusted upward to 
outperform the market over the post-event window. 
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Figure 5: Plot of Independent Stranded Asset and Carbon Budget Events 
 
 
6.2.3 Comparing Events 
Finally, in order to answer whether divestment events are in fact more influential than stranded 
asset or carbon budget events, the two types of events are compared.  The results suggest that 
while divestment events may be less influential over the days surrounding the event, there is 
no statistically significant deviation between the two datasets. Independent t-tests highlighted 
in table five over one, two, five, ten, and 260 day intervals do not highlight any statistically 
significant discrepancy. Figure six plots the cumulative returns for events related to divestment 
versus events related to stranded assets and the carbon budget, relative to the MSCI market 
index. The figure confirms that both types of events lead to underperformance among fossil 
fuel shares. Visually, while stranded asset and carbon budget events seem to have a more 
significant decline around the event day, the difference is not statistically significant. 
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Moreover, while stranded asset and carbon budget events rebound upwards toward the post 
event window, shares seem to maintain their downward trajectory after divestment events. 
 
Table 7: Comparing Divestment Events to Stranded Asset and Carbon Budget Events 
 
 
Figure 6:  Plotting the Impact of Divestment, Stranded Asset, and Carbon Budget Events 
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Concluding Remarks 
Divestment related events do not have a greater negative response relative to events related to 
stranded assets or the carbon budget. Thus, the null hypothesis that divestment events are more 
influential than stranded asset and carbon budget events cannot be rejected. This could suggest 
that all stakeholders are equally impactful, or conversely, that stakeholder theory does not apply 
in this case. 
 
6.3 Conclusion and Next Steps 
The purpose of this chapter was to answer the research questions; whether divestment and 
related events have an impact on the share price of fossil fuel firms. The first null hypothesis, 
that divestment events have no measurable impact on the fossil fuel industry can be rejected. 
However, this result does not represent all divestment events equally. There is an opportunity 
to extend the study further, to adjust for discrepancies between fossil fuel type, geographical 
location, type of divestment announcement, and across the timeline of divestment 
announcements. The second null hypothesis, that divestment events are not more influential 
than events of stranded assets and the carbon budget can not be rejected. The independent 
results confirm that not all events are comparably impactful. There is an opportunity to extend 
this result in the context of the saliency of key stakeholders and the means by which they can 
influence the fossil fuel industry.  
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
 
The results complement the notion that discourse on divestment, stranded assets, and the carbon 
budget are all impactful in influencing the fossil fuel industry. This chapter briefly outlines the 
value of the research conducted. 
 
7.1 Linking Results to Literature 
Literature on fossil-fuel divestment explains that the campaign is pursued by institutional 
investors as a means of social advocacy against the fossil fuel industry. The fossil fuel industry 
is a major contributor to anthropogenic climate change and if climate targets are to be met, the 
majority of existing reserves must be rendered unburnable. There is no empirical evidence 
however, to measure whether announcements of divestment, stranded assets, or the carbon 
budget have any impact on the sector’s corporate objectives. In the context of the efficient 
market hypothesis, this thesis tested the impact of such topics using the event study 
methodology. The results suggest that markets are in fact responding to pressures of 
divestment, stranded assets, and the carbon budget. Moreover, in the context of stakeholder 
theory, this thesis compared shareholder driven divestment events to stakeholder driven events 
of stranded assets and the carbon budget. The results suggest that markets perceive the 
pressures of shareholders and stakeholders equally. The findings contribute back to the 
literature on whether divestment has an impact on the fossil fuel sector, with a resounding yes. 
 
Notably, this is not the first study conducted that measures the impact of divestment events. In 
fact, six of its kind relate to the anti-Apartheid divestment campaign. This is the first of its kind 
in the context of the fossil-fuel divestment campaign. The results attest to the studies by Wright 
and Ferris (1997) and Meznar et al. (1994, 1998) that announcements of divestment lead to 
statistically significant negative returns. The findings of this thesis thus complement the results 
of significant negative returns in the short run, but also expands the findings to suggest that 
there may be a long term impact as well. 
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7.2 Justifying the Results 
Of course, the most common criticisms would stand that the lower prices are simply due to 
market forces or declining oil prices. While both concerns are relevant, this study has a number 
of robustness checks in place to ensure the impact of events are isolated.  
 
First, in order to justify that price impacts are not simply due to market forces, the study 
compares the performance of the industry to the market index over an estimation, event, and 
post-event window. The results show that while the trend across the estimation window for the 
fossil fuel portfolio and the market index are aligned, there is a decoupling between the two 
around the event window. This result carries through the post-event window, where the market 
index and fossil fuel portfolio continue to run in parallel, albeit at a lower price.  
 
Second, in order to justify that the price impacts are simply not in response to falling oil prices, 
the study points to two examples of independent results - one before and one after OPEC’s 
announcement to maintain oil production levels. The first example relates to the third weekend 
of September 2014, which arguably proved to be the most impactful instance across the 
divestment movement. The pressures of the UN climate summit, the people’s climate march, 
the Rockefeller Fund pledge, and over 700 other independent pledges in conjunction, depressed 
fossil fuel share prices by over 3 percent over the event window and sustained at that level over 
the following year. The second example relates to Mark Carney’s speech on the Tragedy of the 
Horizon, an event that occurred after the OPEC announcement. Fossil fuel share prices 
experienced a notable decline relative to the market index as early as 10 days prior to the event, 
indicative of prior knowledge and speculation around this event. However, fossil fuel share 
prices quickly rose after the event, outperforming the market index in as little as five days. If 
in fact these prices were strictly driven by oil prices, it would stand to reason that shares would 
not have seen the correction in prices directly after the event day. These two examples point to 
the fact that while stocks undoubtedly respond to falling oil prices, the results are indicative 
that these isolated events are also impacting share prices. 
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7.3 Contribution of Research 
To shareholders, divestment does have a place in the ethical investors toolbox, as a means to 
influence the corporate objectives of the fossil fuel industry. This does not suggest that all 
pledges to divest, will be equally impactful; the Guardian Media Group divested its one-billion-
dollar fund with little influence whereas the University of Oxford pledged to divest an 
endowment which held no shares to begin with much greater impact. To the advocates of 
divestment, the results suggest that divestment does have an impact on the industry, but does 
not infer that divestment will have an impact on corporate objectives. To the fossil fuel 
industry, the fossil-fuel divestment campaign has affected the industry’s share price, as markets 
perceive these threats as credible to the industry’s expected returns. It is thus in the industry’s 
best interest to engage with shareholders and stakeholder alike, to address their concerns. To 
stakeholders, this thesis encourages continued discourse on the topics of stranded assets and 
the carbon budget, as equally influential to the divestment movement.  
 
To the literature on divestment, this thesis provides the empirical basis against theoretical 
literature and provides the groundwork for more detailed empirical analysis in future studies. 
To reiterate however, this study cannot make any inference to the long-term effect of 
divestment. As such, the results do not confirm that divestment can ‘force change’ on the 
industry; rather that divestment has to date, had an impact in depressing share prices of fossil 
fuel firms. 
 
7.4 Opportunities for Further Research 
Numerous opportunities for further research on the topic of divestment can be pursued. First, 
this thesis can be extended to more succinctly measure the impact of different events, by further 
categorizing and comparing between events and subsamples. Second, the impact of divestment 
can be compared to the impact of other climate change strategies, such as engagement 
initiatives. Finally, divestment can be studied in the context of the divesting intuition, applying 
signaling theory to understand why divesting institutions pledge to divest from fossil fuels, 
even if the action may not be in the divesting firm’s favour.  
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